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A current major policy goal of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) I in the field of wholesale electric regulation
2 is
the promotion of competition among generators, both utility and
1. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was created in 1977 as the successor to
the Federal Power Commission (FPC). Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No.
95-91, § 401, 91 Stat. 565, 582 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (1988)).
FERC's responsibilities include regulating hydroelectric power, natural gas transportation
and sale, and electricity transmission and sale. 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1988).
2. See Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA) § 201(d), 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (1988) (defining
term "wholesale" in context of wholesale electric regulation to mean sale of electric energy
for subsequent resale).
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nonutility, 3 in order to lower rates to consumers.4 FERC believes
3. There are two basic classes of electric generators in the United States, namely utili-
ties and nonutilities. In 1990, utilities generated 92% of the U.S. electric supply, while nonu-
tilities accounted for 8% of generation. EDISON ELEC. INST., 1990 CAPACITY AND GENERATION
OF NON-UTILITY SOURCES OF ENERGY 3 (1991) (reviewing sources of electric supply in United
States). There are various types of electric utilities, including investor-owned utilities, pub-
licly owned utilities, federal agencies, and rural cooperatives. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 1990 1 (1992) [hereinafter ELECTRIC POWER AN-
NUAL 1990] (profiling structure of electric power industry in United States). In 1990, there
were 3241 utilities in the United States, id. at 5, and although investor-owned utilities repre-
sented only 8% of all utilities, id., they accounted for 71%6 of total generating capacity, 70%6 of
sales, and 72%o of generation. Id. at 3-4. Publicly owned utilities, which include municipali-
ties, public power districts, state agencies, irrigation districts, and other state organizations,
id. at 1, supplied 9%6 of generation. d at 4. Federal agencies, including the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, International Water and Boundary Commission,
U.S. Department of Energy, Alaska Power Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, id at 1-2, accounted for 8%6 of electric generation in 1990. Id. at 4. Although numerous,
rural cooperatives supplied only 4% of total generation. Id. at 4-5.
A fundamental difference between utilities and nonutilities is that utilities are established
under state or federal law, or by franchise. See 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGU-
LATION 8 (1988) (noting that public utilities typically have been given exclusive franchises in
return for assuming obligations of common carriers and duty to provide service). By contrast,
nonutilities are privately held companies that have entered the field of electric generation
without any legal mandate or charter, but rely solely on contractual relationships with utilities.
See ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 1990, supra, at 2 (noting that nonutility power generators, unlike
electric utilities, do not have designated franchise service area). Nonutilities are comprised of
qualifying facilities (QFs) under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92 Stat. 3117, 3144-47 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1988)),
and independent power producers. ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 1990, supra, at 1. Qualifying
facilities under PURPA are either cogenerators or small power producers. Id. Cogenerators
are generating facilities that produce electricity and another form of useful thermal energy
such as heat or steam for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes and meet other
criteria established under PURPA. Id. Small power producers generate electricity using
waste, renewable energy sources such as water, wind, and solar, or geothermal energy as
primary energy sources. Id. Independent power producers are nonutility electric generators
other than QFs that sell at wholesale to franchised electric utilities. Id. Significantly, some of
the independent power producers in the United States are very large firms with substantial
resources. INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT, 110 INDEPENDENT POWER COMPANIES 1 (1991) (list-
ing top 25 independent power producers, including subsidiaries of Bechtel, Dow Chemical,
Enron Corporation, Mitsubishi Corporation, and Texaco). In 1990, cogenerators and small
power producers accounted for 94% of nonutility generation, while independent power pro-
ducers represented only 6%y. EDISON ELEC. INST., supra, at 6.
4. See, e.g., Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234, at 61,753 (1992) (stating that
competitive markets can provide greater efficiencies than traditional cost-based rate regula-
tion in electric generation and supply); Public Serv. Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. V 61,367, at
62,225 (noting that "improved supply options should allow the purchasing utilities to reduce
their costs, which will benefit their ratepayers when these cost reductions are passed through
in their bills"), modified sub nom. PSI Energy, Inc., 52 F.E.R.C. 9 61,260, ciarified, 53 F.E.R.C.
61,131 (1990), petition dismissed sub noma. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 736
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 61,242, at 61,790 (1987) (allowing
experimental competitive rates because "competition ... encourages utilities to make efficient
decisions with a minimum of regulatory intervention. Ultimately, consumers should benefit
from lower prices as competition improves efficiency."), modified, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,121 (1989),
modified, 50 F.E.R.C. $ 61,339 (1990), modified sub noma. Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C.
61,099, at 61,319 (rejecting flexible pricing for bulk power because applicant had failed to
eliminate anticompetitive effects by mitigating market power in generation or transmission),
granting stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh 'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. T 61,495, appealfiled, No.
91-1404 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1991), modified, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,249 (1992); Public Serv. Co. of
N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. T 61,469, at 62,038 (1983) (declaring that "competition penalizes a seller
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that an increase in the number of potential electric generation sup-
pliers will create competitive pressures that will improve efficiency5
and promote bulk power trades6 among utilities having different
generation costs. 7 This policy is a deliberate departure from tradi-
tional cost-based ratemaking,8 which is focused not on fostering effi-
ciency but rather on preventing abuse of monopoly power.9 By
contrast, market-based ratemaking relies on competitive forces to
promote efficiency and should concentrate new electric generation
in the hands of the most efficient generators.
In large part, FERC is attempting to advance trends that have al-
that is inefficient or has an unreasonable pricing strategy" and that "[c]onsumers ... benefit
because the improvements in efficiency [due to competition] lead to lower prices").
5. See Entergy Sews., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,753 (approving market-based rates for large
bulk power sales because rates set via competitive forces will increase number of potential
suppliers and result in cost savings to ratepayers); Public Sew. Co. of Ind, 51 F.E.R.C. at
62,224-25 (stating that competitive pricing improves efficiency by creating incentives for full
utilization of existing capacity and innovation).
6. See infra note 14 (defining bulk power trades).
7. See Public Sew. Co. oflnd., 51 F.E.R.C. at 62,225 (approving market-based rates for
firm wholesale power sales in order to provide less costly means of supplying new power
demands); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,789 (stating that "[b]ecause not all utilities
are equally good at building and operating generating plants, we believe that a rational regu-
latory policy requires that we encourage electric utilities to engage in bulk power trades that
coordinate their resources and thus produce efficiency gains") (footnote omitted); Public Serv.
Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. at 62,059-60 (approving experiment to promote efficiency in bulk
power markets through market-based pricing of wholesale sales among utilities with differing
generation costs).
8. A basic principle of traditional rate regulation is that public utility rates are based on
the utility's cost of service. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-59 (1982) (ex-
amining typical justifications for regulation and methods of cost-of-service ratemaking); I
KAHN, supra note 3, at 26-57 (detailing nature of cost-of-service regulation); see also Entergy
Sews., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,753 (justifying agency policy change supporting market-based
rate regulation by pointing out that traditional cost-of-service regulation is not always ade-
quate to meet needs of growing competitive bulk power market); HousE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 102D CONG., IST SESs., ELECTRICITY: A NEw REGULATORY ORDER? 132-44
(Comm. Print F 1991) [hereinafter ELECTRICITY: A NEW REGULATORY ORDER?] (discussing
development of utility rate regulation and explaining rate methodology designed to ensure
"fair return on fair value" based on operating expenses, depreciation, capital improvements,
and other costs). FERC has held, however, that a departure from cost-based ratemaking is
justified where an industry is experiencing "contrasting or changing characteristics." Entergy
Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,752 (quoting from opinion in Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v.
FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1503 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984)). The FPA requires
that FERC set electricity rates that are "just and reasonable." 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1988).
The "just and reasonable" standard is a longstanding one, having been established early in
the context of government rate regulation, and the standard seeks to provide utilities a fair
return on value. See, e.g., Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923) (holding that governmentally imposed utility rates that
are not sufficient to yield reasonable rates of return are unjust, and that public utilities are
entitled to earn return on value of property employed in provision of service that is equal to
return earned by other businesses facing similar risks); see also Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466,
546-47 (1898) (ruling that fair value of property used, costs of construction, improvements,
and other expenses should be examined when calculating reasonableness of rates set by fed-
eral government for railroad).
9. See I KAHN, supra note 3, at 26-29 (describing need for regulation to restrain monop-
olies such as utility companies from charging higher rates than would be possible in competi-
tive market).
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ready had a dramatic impact on electric generation in the United
States. Just thirteen years ago, utilities controlled over ninety-seven
percent of U.S. electric generating capacity.' 0 In recent years, how-
ever, the growth in nonutility generating capacity has increased
much more rapidly than utility additions,I and the nonutility share
of total capacity is projected to nearly quadruple between 1979 and
2010.12 Increasingly, state public utility commissions have adopted
competitive bidding programs that award the construction of new
generation facilities to the lowest bidder, which promotes efficiency
and encourages nonutility entry into the electric generation
market.' 3
One obstacle that FERC perceives as hindering greater competi-
tiveness in bulk power markets 14 is the largely unfettered control of
transmission systems by individual electric utilities.' 5 Control of
10. See EDISON ELEc. INST., 1988 CAPACITY AND GENERATION OF NON-UTILITY SOURCES OF
ENERGY 7 (1990) (detailing generating capacity in U.S. by type of producer, i.e., utility versus
nonutility).
11. While utility generating capacity increased from 688,733 to 735,129 megawatts be-
tween 1985 and 1990, a rise of less than 77%, nonutility generating capacity grew from 22,920
to 45,127 megawatts, a surge of nearly 100%. See EDISON ELEC. INST., ADVANCE RELEASE OF
DATA FOR THE 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 4 (1992) (pro-
viding data on additions to installed generating capacity by utilities and nonutilities in 1990);
EDISON ELEC. INST., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 1990 7 (1991)
(showing increase in electric generating capacity ofutilities and nonutilities between 1985 and
1989).
12. Compare EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 10, at 7 (showing that 2.9% of total electric
generating capacity in 1979 was controlled by nonutilities) with ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OuTLooK-WrrH PROJECTIONS TO 2010 69 (1992) (project-
ing that 11 % of total electric generating capacity in 2010 will be owned by nonutilities).
13. See NATIONAL INDEP. ENERGY PRODUCERS, BIDDING FOR POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF
COMPETrVE BIDDING IN ELECTRIC GENERATION 11 (1990) (stating that at least 27 states have
adopted, allowed, or are considering competitive bidding for new electric generation
facilities).
14. The phrase "bulk power sales" or "bulk power markets" denotes wholesale electric
sales or markets. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., ELECTRIC POWER WHEEL-
ING AND DEALING: TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INCREASING COMPETITION 41 (1989)
[hereinafter OTA, WHEELING AND DEALING]. Two categories of wholesale power sales exist:
(1) requirements sales, which generally take the form of firm sales from an investor-owned
utility to a publicly owned utility that has little or no generating capacity; and (2) coordination
sales undertaken for reliability or economy purposes, typically involving short-term sales be-
tween investor-owned utilities. ELECTRICITY: A NEW REGULATORY ORDER?, supra note 8, at
68-71. For a discussion of firm and nonfirm wheeling, see infra note 54.
15. See Public Serv. Co. of Col., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,322, at 62,038 (1992) (noting that
FERC's "fundamental competitive concern... is that an increase in control over key transmis-
sion facilities may lead to a greater ability to block competing lower-cost suppliers from reach-
ing wholesale electric customers"); Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,010
(holding that restrictive transmission access conditions are necessary for approval of merger
because Northeast Utilities' domination of key transmission corridors and facilities would
otherwise allow it to control bulk power trade), reh'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991),
modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992); Public Serv.
Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367, at 62,192 (conditioning approval of market-based rates on
public utility's acceptance of open access transmission conditions, out of concern that utility's
complete control of transmission assets could otherwise be used to gain advantage over com-
peting power suppliers), modified sub noma. PSI Energy, Inc., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,260, clarified, 53
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transmission lines may enable utilities to deny other generators ac-
cess to bulk power markets that are not directly interconnected with
those generators. For this reason, FERC is convinced that increased
access to utility transmission lines must be provided to potential
electric suppliers so that the full benefits of generator competition
may be realized.16 Through a series of administrative orders,' 7
FERC has developed a transmission access policy that promotes
"wheeling," which is the transfer of electricity from a generator to a
purchaser over the transmission system of an intermediate utility.'8
Apparently, FERC views electric utilities as akin to the walled cities
of medieval Europe, and intends to wield its transmission access
policy as a battering ram to knock down these walls and expand
electric wholesale markets.
Part I of this Comment examines FERC's limited authority to or-
der wheeling under sections 211 and 212 of the Federal Power Act
of 1935 (FPA). 19 Part II studies FERC's exercise of its broad statu-
tory authority to condition mergers and approve rates in order to
entice utilities to accept transmission service obligations and achieve
the agency's open access transmission goal. Part III criticizes cer-
tain transmission service conditions imposed by FERC as either be-
yond the agency's authority or inconsistent with goals of the FPA.
Part IV reviews recently enacted legislation that sharply expands
FERC's authority to order wheeling. Finally, Part V offers recom-
mendations for the development of electric transmission policy by
FERC.
F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990),petition dismissed sub nom. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 954
F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 1 61,095, at 61,288-89
(describing potential anticompetitive harm from individual utility's control of transmission
system), clarified, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh'g granted, 45 F.E.R.C. $ 61,500 (1988), reh 'g granted
in part, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209, at 61,736 (1989), enforced, 51 F.E.R.C. T 61,295 (1990), remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,469, at 62,046 (1983) ("Without a guarantee that
wheeling service will be provided on these occasions, it is unlikely that a competitive market
for [bulk power] could emerge.").
16. See Public Serv. Co. of CoL, 58 F.E.R.C. at 62,039 (finding merged utility's offer to
satisfy all requests from other utilities for transmission sufficient to avoid anticompetitive ef-
fects of merger); Public Sero. Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. at 62,193 (requiring public utility to re-
duce its market power by offering transmission service to other generators); Utah Power &
Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,289 (stating that access to transmission facilities by competitors is
required for efficiency purposes).
17. See infra notes 46-50, 96 and accompanying text (reviewing merger and market-based
rate orders that established foundation of FERC transmission access policy).
18. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973) (defining
"wheeling").
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-824k (1988). Sections 211 and 212 of the FPA were substantially
revised by the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486,
§§ 721-722, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915-19 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-824k). See infra
notes 218-50 and accompanying text (discussing Energy Policy Act of 1992).
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I. FERC AUTHORITY TO ORDER WHEELING WAS LIMITED
A. Federal Power Act of 1935
As originally conceived, Part II of the FPA would have imposed
common carrier obligations on electric utilities by making it "the
duty of every public utility to .. .transmit energy for any person
upon reasonable request." 20 Further, the 1935 legislation would
have empowered FERC's predecessor, the Federal Power Commis-
sion (FPC), to order wheeling if it found such action to be "neces-
sary or desirable in the public interest." 2' Enactment of this bill
would have granted the FPC and its successor wide discretion to
mandate wheeling. Instead, Congress deleted these broad provi-
sions from the proposed legislation, thereby rejecting the imposi-
tion of common carrier status on electric utilities in favor of
allowing voluntary action by the utilities.22 The Supreme Court rec-
ognized FERC's lack of wheeling authority in Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States,23 where it held that "there is no authority granted the
Commission under Part II of the Federal Power Act to order
[wheeling]."24
B. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)25
granted FERC limited authority to order wheeling by adding sec-
tions 211 and 212 to the FPA.26 FERC authority to order wheeling
under section 211 was sharply expanded by the Energy Policy Act of
1992.27 For purposes of this Comment, FERC transmission access
policy will be evaluated based on the standards in sections 211 and
212 before the wholesale revisions to these sections in the Energy
Policy Act. Under section 211, FERC could issue a wheeling order if
20. S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 213 (1935); H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 213
(1935).
21. S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 213 (1935); H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 213
(1935).
22. S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1318, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1935).
23. 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (rejecting effort by federal agency to order wheeling under
FPA).
24. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375 (1973).
25. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-1 to a-
3, 824i-k, 2601-2645, and scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
26. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §§ 203-204, 92
Stat. 3117, 3136-3140 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-824k (1988)).
27. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915-16 (to
be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j); see infra note 223 (describing broad grant of wheeling author-
ity under § 721 of Energy Policy Act). The Energy Policy Act drastically revised § 212 of the
FPA as well. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 722, 106 Stat. at 2916-19 (to be codified at 16
U.S.C. § 824k).
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it found that such order: (1) was in the public interest; (2) would
conserve energy, promote efficiency, or improve reliability; and (3)
met the criteria of section 212.28 Section 212 prohibited issuance of
a wheeling order if such order: (1) was not likely to result in a rea-
sonably ascertainable uncompensated economic loss for any af-
fected utility;29 (2) would not place an undue burden on any affected
utility; (3) would not unreasonably impair the reliability of any af-
fected utility; or (4) would not impair the ability of any electric utility
affected by the order to render adequate service to its customers. 30
As was the case with the FPA, the version of PURPA originally
approved by the House contained provisions that would have
granted FERC sweeping authority to order wheeling. 31 Yet Con-
gress again chose not to include those provisions in the version of
the bill enacted into law.3 2 Deletion of the wheeling authority con-
stituted an express rejection by Congress of the role of common
carrier for electric utilities. Moreover, the addition of section 211
further limited FERC's authority to mandate transmission service by
prohibiting a wheeling order absent a finding that "such an order
would reasonably preserve existing competitive relationships." 33 As
a result of this restriction on mandated wheeling, FERC has never
issued a wheeling order under the authority granted in PURPA.3 4
Essentially, sections 211 and 212 proved to be dead letters. 35 While
28. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (1988). This subsection was deleted in lieu of substitute lan-
guage in the Energy Policy Act. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721(2), 106 Stat. at 2915; see
infra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to § 211 of FPA).
29. An "affected utility" is either one of the parties to a wholesale transaction, or the
transmitting utility. H.R. REP. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7659, 7825.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a) (1988). This subsection was deleted by the Energy Policy Act.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 722(1), 106 Stat. at 2915 (amending § 212 of FPA).
31. See H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 541(b)(1) (1977) (authorizing FPC to order
wheeling whenever agency deems such action "necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est"). This unenacted legislation would only have precluded the FPC from issuing a wheeling
order if the order would not benefit consumers by reducing electric energy supply costs or
otherwise provide public benefits by ensuring that economical, environmentally sensitive sup-
plies of electric energy were made generally available, or if the order would impose economic
hardship on the transmitting utility or its customers. Id. § 541(b)(2).
32. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-824k (1988) (failing to grant broad power to FERC to order
wheeling transactions).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c)(1) (1988). This subsection was deleted by the Energy Policy Act.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721(4)(A), 106 Stat. at 2915 (amending § 211 of FPA).
34. See, e.g., Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,204, at
61,530-39 (1983) (rejecting power company's application for wheeling order because
§ 21 1(c)(l) of PURPA prohibited issuance of any wheeling order that does not "reasonably
preserve existing competitive relationships" of transmitting utility).
35. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 676 (5th Cir. 1981) (conclud-
ing that FPA did not authorize FERC to issue wheeling orders that impose common carrier
duties on utilities), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v.
FERC, 638 F.2d 388, 400-03 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting wheeling order because order had ef-
fect of expanding utility's voluntary commitment to provide transmission service), cert. denied,
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FERC sought to encourage competition through transmission ac-
cess, the agency lacked power to order wheeling for the sole pur-
pose of enhancing competition. The Second Circuit held that
sections 211 and 212 clearly indicated that wheeling cannot be or-
dered solely on the basis of the public interest and the enhancement
of competition.3 6 In addition, the Fifth Circuit rebuked an effort by
FERC to foster competition through mandatory transmission access,
stating that although its goal was "laudable," the agency "is without
authority under the FPA to compel wheeling."
37
II. SEIZING THE BRASS RING: FERC IMPOSES OPEN ACCESS
CONDITIONS IN MERGER AND RATE CASES
Upon discovering the stark limits on its authority under sections
211 and 212 to order wheeling, FERC resorted to other powers
granted it under the FPA to induce utilities to provide transmission
services voluntarily. The broadest grants of discretionary authority
provided FERC by the FPA reside in its section 203 authority to
approve and condition utility mergers3 8 and its section 205 and 206
authority to set wholesale rates. 39 These powers supplied FERC
with an indirect means by which to implement its transmission ac-
cess policy.
A. FERC Has Imposed Transmission Access Through Its Discretionary
Authority to Approve Mergers
1. FERC enjoys broad discretion to impose conditions under its section
203 merger-approval authority
Electric utilities seeking to merge must obtain, as a preliminary
matter, FERC's approval of their proposed merger. 40 Such ap-
proval will only be granted if the merger is found to be "consistent
with the public interest." 41 Typically, a utility merger will be held to
454 U.S. 821 (1981); Southeastern PowerAdmin., 25 F.E.R.C. at 61,530 (rejecting application for
wheeling order under §§ 211 and 212 of FPA because § 21 l(c)(1) prohibited wheeling order
that does not "reasonably preserve existing competitive relationships" of transmitting utility).
36. See New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 638 F.2d at 402 ("[I]t is clear from the express
requirements of §§ 211 and 212 that the public interest and the enhancement of competition
are not alone sufficient justification for compelling wheeling.").
37. See Florida Power & Light Co., 660 F.2d at 677-79 (reversing FERC order compelling
utility company to file amended tariff schedule for interchange transmission service, on basis
that order would impermissibly impose common carrier status on utility).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 824b (1988); see also infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (reviewing
FERC's authority to condition approval of mergers).
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824c-d (1988); see also infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (re-
viewing FERC's discretion to set rates for wholesale power sales and transmission services).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a) (1988).
41. Id.
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be consistent with the public interest if it is deemed to be consistent
with the standards of the FPA.42 Consistency with the public inter-
est is a very broad mandate, and FERC therefore enjoys wide lati-
tude in directly and conditionally approving utility mergers.43
2. FERC has imposed open access transmission through its merger
authority
Fortunately for FERC, the number of mergers in the electric util-
ity industry increased in the 1980s. 44 For that reason, merger appli-
42. See 16 U.S.C. § 824b(b) (1988) (granting FERC explicit authority under § 203(b) to
condition mergers to "secure the maintenance of adequate service and the coordination in the
public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission"). Judicial review of
agency rulemakings is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and courts may revise a
rule only if the rule is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." Administrative Procedure Act, § 706(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1988). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reaffirmed FERC's broad
discretion to condition mergers in EnvironmentalAction, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir.
1991), holding that "[w]e set aside a decision of the FERC only if it is arbitrary and capricious
or otherwise contrary to law." Id- at 1061. The appeals court observed that FERC may ap-
prove a merger only if the merger is found to be consistent with the public interest and ex-
plained that "the relevant 'public interest' includes both the preservation of economic
competition, as expressed in the antitrust laws of general application, and the various policies
reflected in the statutes specific to energy regulation." l (citations omitted). In this case,
the relevant statute was the FPA, id at 1059, so the policies of that act helped define the
public interest to be protected.
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 824b (1988) (requiring FERC approval for proposed mergers but
failing to grant express authority to FERC to impose merger conditions). Despite its lack of
explicit conditioning power in § 203(a), FERC has found implicit authority to condition merg-
ers under the section by maintaining that the power to condition merger approval is sub-
sumed within the power to deny merger consummation. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56
F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,011-13 (defining FERC's broad authority to condition mergers in
public interest under § 203(a) and (b)), reh'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58
F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'gdismissedas moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992); Utah Power & Light Co.,
45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,280 (stating that power to condition mergers is not impermissible
extension of FERC's authority to deny merger requests), clarfied, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh'g
granted, 45 F.E.R.C. 161,500 (1988), reh'g granted in part, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209 (1989), enforced,
51 F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v.
FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991). By contrast, § 203(b) of the FPA expressly authorizes
FERC to condition mergers to "secure the maintenance of adequate service and the coordina-
tion in the public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission." 16
U.S.C. § 824b(b) (1988). According to FERC, conditioning approval achieves the same end
as requiring the applicant to submit a new application that resolves the concerns that caused
the initial rejection of the merger proposal. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,280.
Historically, the public interest findings required by § 203 have been based on the test in
Commonwealth Edison Co. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 36 F.P.C. 927, 931 (1966), aff'd sub
nom. Utility Users League v. FPC, 394 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.) (denying petition for review of FPC
order approving merger of electric and gas companies on ground that no showing was made
of merger's adverse effect on competition), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 953 (1968). The decision
established a nonexclusive list of criteria to be considered when evaluating whether a pro-
posed merger is consistent with the public interest. See id. at 932 (requiring merged company
to conform to purposes of both FPA and Public Utility Holding Company Act on public inter-
est grounds). One of the central factors mentioned in the opinion as a public interest consid-
eration is "the effect the proposed merger may have on the existing competitive situation."
Id.
44. ELECTRIcrrY: A Naw REGULATORY ORDER?, supra note 8, at 94. Following the enact-
ment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as
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cations represented a promising vehicle for the development of
FERC's open access transmission policy through exercise of its sec-
tion 203 authority. FERC has conditioned approval of utility merg-
ers on companies' acceptance of broad obligations to provide
transmission services to third parties, a practice that is otherwise
known as "open access." '45 The landmark case in this method of
implementation for FERC's transmission access policy is Utah Power
& Light Co.46 This case approved the merger of Pacific Power &
Light and Utah Power & Light into a large utility holding companty
called PacifiCorp, whose subsidiaries would serve seven states.
47
Although FERC explicitly disavowed the precedential value of the
decision,48 the conditions imposed in Utah Power & Light were never-
theless adopted in Northeast Utilities Service Co.49 and in several other
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-6 (1988)), there was very little merger activity among
electric utilities. ELECTRICITY: A NEW REGULATORY ORDER?, supra note 8, at 94. However, the
pace of merger activity accelerated in the early 1980s. Id. at 94-95; see also U.S. GEN. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRICITY SUPPLY: REGULATING UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES IN A
CHANGING ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 4 (1992) (noting that over 53 utilities were reported to have
been merged with or acquired by utilities or utility holding companies between 1980 and
1991). Furthermore, some analysts believe that a massive consolidation is in the offing. See
ScoTr A. FENN, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., MERGERS AND FINANCIAL RESTRUC-
TURING IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 29-51 (1988) (concluding that electric utility indus-
try is entering period of major restructuring); Edward Tirello, Consolidation Coming to Industry
Says Analyst, ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER, May 1987, at 17-18 (predicting industry consolidation
will occur as result of continued increase in competition).
45. See Public Serv. Co. of Col., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,322, at 62,039 (1992) (approving pro-
posed merger because applicant agreed to provide transmission access to third parties in ar-
rangement that was deemed "generally consistent with the Commission's recently announced
guidelines"); Kansas Power & Light Co., 56 F.E.R.C. V 61,356, at 62,378-79 (1991) (accepting
merger request that included open access transmission commitment); Northeast Utils. Serv. Co.,
56 F.E.R.C. at 62,017-24 (conditioning approval for requested merger on utility's acceptance
of open access transmission service obligations); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at
61,289-95 (accepting merger between Pacific Power & Light and Utah Power & Light upon
their acceptance of open access transmission service obligations).
46. 45 F.E.R.C. 1 61,095 (1988).
47. See Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,269 (approving merger
subject to acceptance of open access transmission service obligations by applicants), clarified,
45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh'g granted, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,500 (1988), reh'g granted in part, 47 F.E.R.C.
V 61,209 (1989), enforced, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub noma. Envi-
ronmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
48. See Utah Power & Light Co., 47 F.E.R.C. at 61,733 ("[No inference should be drawn
that the transmission access conditions set forth [in Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C.
61,095 (1988)] represent Commission policy, to be applied generically in the future, regard-
ing transmission access").
49. 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, reh 'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 1 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C.
61,070, reh 'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992). A number of significant differ-
ences exist between the factual situations in Utah Power & Light and Northeast Utilities. First, in
contrast to Utah Power & Light, see infra note 50 (discussing prior anticompetitive practices of
Utah Power & Light Company), the applicant in Northeast Utilities had never denied a wheeling
request for anticompetitive reasons. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,009-10. Sec-
ond, FERC imposed transmission access conditions in Utah Power &Light partly because there
was no regional power pool within the service area of the combined company that would
potentially be able to prevent the company from exercising market power over transmission.
Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,283. Northeast Utilities, however, operated within
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merger cases.5 0
It should be noted that in order to approve the proposed merger
in Utah Power & Light, FERC reversed an administrative law judge's
decision to the contrary. 51 The administrative law judge had recom-
mended that the proposed merger be rejected and specifically re-
fused to attach conditions that would "transmogrify a statutorily
unacceptable proposal into one that meets the public interest."5 2
the New England Power Pool, which effectively prevented the utility from exercising market
power. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 61,985. Third, FERC was influenced in Utah
Power & Light by the prospect that the merged company would control over 88% of the trans-
mission capacity in the Northwest and Rocky Mountain areas. Utah Power & Light Co., 45
F.E.R.C. at 61,286-87. FERC attempted to draw a parallel in Northeast Utilities, charging that
the merged company would control a "transmission curtain" around Eastern Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,005-06, but in actuality, the
merged company would control only five percent of the uncommitted transmission capacity in
the region. Request for Rehearing of Applicant at 58, Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C.
61,269 (1991), reh'g granted, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070 (1992).
50. See Public Serv. Co. of Col., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,322, at 62,034 (1992) ("Colorado...
attempted to model the proposed tariff after transmission conditions imposed or approved by
the Commission in other merger cases[,]" including Utah Power & Light); Kansas Power &
Light Co. & Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,356, at 62,378-79 (1991) (accepting
offer of settlement that included open access transmission commitment based on conditions
in Utah Power & Light); Kansas City Power & Light Co. & Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F.E.R.C.
61,097, at 61,276 (1990) (noting that applicants are "prepared to accept extensive transmis-
sion obligations" that are "substantially similar" to those imposed in Utah Power & Light). But
see UtiliCorp United, Inc. & Centel Corp., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,031, at 61,120-22 (1991) (refusing
to impose Utah Power & Light transmission access conditions because there is no evidence that
merger will consolidate control over transmission).
The merger of Pacific Power & Light and Utah Power & Light occurred under certain
unique circumstances. The most striking aspect of the merger was the sheer size of the
merged company, which would span seven states. See Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at
61,268-69 (describing service territory of merged company). Further, one of the applicants in
the case had previously engaged in anticompetitive practices. lId at 61,287 (observing that
Utah Power & Light "exercised... monopoly control by foreclosing competitors from using
its transmission facilities to sell power at UP&L's southern interconnections" and "consist-
ently refused to permit the wheeling of low-cost power across its system"). Utah Power &
Light "admit[ted] that it ha[d] never provided firm wheeling service to any major Northwest
utility wishing to sell to buyers in the Desert Southwest, southern Nevada or California." Id.
FERC used this factor to support its decision to impose conditions on the Utah Power & Light
merger, and FERC also justified the conditions by noting that no regional power pool existed
within the service area of the combined company. Id at 61,283 (commenting that absence of
power pool would enable merged company to exercise greater market power over coordina-
tion services because of its strategic control over transmission). Another factor that influ-
enced FERC in Utah Power & Light was the prospect that the merged company would control
over 88% of the transmission capacity between the Northwest and the Rocky Mountain area.
Id. at 61,286-87.
51. See Utah Power & Light Co., 43 F.E.R.C. 63,030, at 65,354 (rejecting merger re-
quest because merger would "substantially lessen competition"), rev'd, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095,
at 61,289-95 (approving merger subject to acceptance of open access transmission service
obligations by applicants), claified, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh'g granted, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,500
(1988), reh 'g granted in part, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209 (1989), enforced, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990),
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
52. Id. (holding that FERC cannot approve proposed merger because it clearly "tends to
substantially lessen competition and create a monopoly, [and] cannot be resurrected by the
application of ineffective CPR conditions").
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FERC showed no such reticence to allow the merger, perhaps be-
cause the merger presented a golden opportunity for the agency to
develop its transmission access policy.
a. Absolute obligation to provide firm transmission out of existing
capacity
Although FERC reserved the decision whether to expand trans-
mission capacity for the merged company and its state regulators to
make,53 the agency imposed an absolute duty to satisfy firm wheel-
ing requests54 on the Utah Power & Light applicants. 55 That is, if the
merged company lacks available transmission capacity to honor a
request from an eligible utility beyond that needed to serve its na-
tive load customers, 56 the company is required within five years of
the request to make sufficient capacity available to satisfy all such
requests by reducing or altering its system use.57 This absolute ob-
ligation to provide transmission service, even at the expense of in-
creased costs to native load customers, is known as the "Utah
Hammer." 58 The only exception FERC allows to this absolute duty
53. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,294.
54. There are two types of wheeling service offered by electric utilities: "firm" and
"nonfirm" wheeling. Firm wheeling may be offered in long-term contracts ranging up to 20
to 40 years in length, while nonfirm wheeling is generally of shorter duration. KEVIN KELLY ET
AL., NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., SOME ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES FOR PRICING
WHEELED POWER 330-31 (1987). FERC has defined firm wheeling as a utility's contractual
obligation to be prepared to transmit a specified amount of electric power for a specified
period of time, subject to the terms and conditions in a service agreement, and nonfirm
wheeling as transmission service that is interruptible at the option of the transmitting utility.
See Utah Power &Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,310 (defining terms that govern wheeling policy).
55. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,294.
56. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,014 n.259 (defining native
load customers as customers for whom utility, "by statute, franchise or contract, has under-
taken an obligation to plan, construct, and operate its system to provide reliable service"),
reh g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh 'g dismissed as moot,
59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
57. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,294, clarified, 45 F.E.R.C.
61,132, reh'g granted, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,500 (1988), reh 'g granted in part, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209
(1989), enforced, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Environmental
Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
58. See Utah Power &Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,295 (requiring merged company to limit
low-cost off-system transactions to satisfy firm wheeling requests). An eligible utility whose
request is not met within five years may institute a complaint before FERC. Id, at 61,294. If
the complainant shows that the merged company has failed to meet its wheeling service obli-
gation within five years of a request, the merged company will be required to reduce its use of
transmission capacity for economy transactions to the extent necessary to meet all ottstand.
ing requests for firm transmission service. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,024; Utah
Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,295. In Utah Power & Light, Commissioner Trabandt
sharply criticized the majority's use of the "Utah Hammer" to sanction the merged company
for failure to provide transmission service, despite the company's good faith efforts to fulfill
its transmission obligations. Utah Power & Light Co., 47 F.E.R.C. at 61,764 (Trabandt,
Comm'r, dissenting). The Commissioner argued that, "[b]y definition, if the merged com-
pany exercised due diligence, that means the failure to accommodate wheeling arose from
circumstances beyond its control." Id. Commissioner Trabandt preferred to adopt a due
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to wheel, even in the face of immutable constraints on utility system
expansion, occurs when provision of firm wheeling on behalf of
third parties will impair the reliability of service to native load cus-
tomers.59 A duty to wheel applies even where satisfaction of a trans-
mission request is unnecessary to mitigate the anticompetitive
effects of a merger, because FERC requires merged companies to
honor the resale or reassignment of capacity from eligible utilities to
third parties.6 0 FERC imposes this absolute duty in lieu of utilities'
voluntary commitments to provide transmission service.61
b. Mandatory construction of new transmission capacity to provide
wheeling for third parties
FERC also imposed an absolute obligation on the merged compa-
nies in Utah Power & Light and Northeast Utilities to expand their trans-
mission systems to meet demand from eligible utilities.6 2 FERC
rejected the reservations proposed by Northeast Utilities on the
company's voluntary commitment to construct transmission facili-
ties, because such an exception would excuse companies' inability to
expand systems after "reasonable best efforts" to do so are made.63
diligence standard of review for wheeling requests rather than to impose an absolute duty on
utilities to provide transmission services. Id.
59. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,199 (holding that Northeast Utilities
would not be required to provide firm transmission service to third parties when immutable
constraints such as siting or environmental regulations prevent expansion of transmission
facilities, if wheeling would impair service to native load customers, and stressing that "under
no circumstances will NU be required to provide firm wheeling service out of existing transmis-
sion capacity where doing so would impair or degrade reliability of service to native load
customers"); see also Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,294 (affirming that merged
company may refuse to wheel during transition period if honoring request would impair
reliability).
60. See Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,295 (proscribing utility-imposed restric-
tions on resale or reassignment of transmission capacity to third parties).
61. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,012 (finding Northeast
Utilities' voluntary transmission commitments insufficient to satisfy public interest), reh'g
granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59
F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,290 (reviewing public
benefit of applicants' voluntary commitment to consider requests for transmission service on
case-by-case basis). In Northeast Utilities, FERC rejected voluntary commitments that it con-
ceded would result in improved transmission. Northeast Utils. Sewv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,012
("The issue is not simply whether the merged company will offer improved transmission
service.").
62. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,022-24 (conditioning approval of
merger in part on acceptance of duty to satisfy wheeling requests by third parties by con-
structing new transmission facilities); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at
61,293 (requiring merged company to expand its system as necessary if sufficient lead time is
provided and contract term is economically adequate to support enlarged facilities) clarified,
45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh'g granted, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,500 (1988), reh'g granted in part, 47
F.E.R.C. 61,209 (1989), enforced, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
63. Northeast Utils. Ser. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,022. Northeast Utilities had proposed the
following three limitations on its voluntary commitment to build new transmission facilities:
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The presiding administrative law judge in Northeast Utilities had ap-
proved this "due diligence" exception to the company's wheeling
commitment, in light of concerns that, without the exception, native
load customers would be adversely affected "where a transmission
constraint that arises cannot be removed, due to siting, environmen-
tal or other regulatory impasse." 64 FERC overruled this seemingly
practical standard in favor of imposing an absolute duty to satisfy all
requests for system expansion. 65
FERC asserted that "five years is a reasonable maximum period of
time for the merged company to obtain sufficient additional trans-
mission capacity... to satisfy all bona fide requests by other utilities
for long-term firm wheeling, as well as its own needs." 66 The
agency position contradicts the North American Electric Reliability
Council's warning that "growing obstacles to the siting and certifica-
tion of new lines could make necessary expansion of the transmis-
sion systems extremely difficult." 67 Further, FERC's own Trans-
mission Task Force reported in 1989 that completion of certain
transmission projects may take as long as sixteen years, a fact that
makes the agency's decision even more puzzling. 6
8
(1) The affected wheeling customers must commit in advance to contribute to the
costs associated with such construction...;
(2) NU is able feasibly to construct the[] additional facilities, consistent with local
and regional reliability and siting considerations ... ; and
(3) NU, after using reasonable best efforts, is able to obtain all regulatory approvals re-
quired for such construction to take place on terms that do not impair the feasibility
of the project.
Id. (emphasis added). FERC accepted the first limitation proposed by Northeast Utilities, but
rejected the second and third limitations and required substantial modifications. Id. at
62,022-24.
64. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. 63,020, at 65,221-22 (1990) (accepting util-
ity's preference for serving native load customers over satisfying third-party requests where
system is constrained, because "merging companies' very existences are linked to their obliga-
tion to serve native load customers" and native load customers have borne costs of construc-
tion of transmission system), modified, 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,022, reh'g granted, 57
F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C.
61,089 (1992).
65. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,022-24 (overruling admin-
istrative law judge's due diligence exception and requiring applicant to satisfy all requests for
firm transmission service within five years), reh 'ggranted, 57 F.E.R.C. 1 61,340 (1991), modified,
58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
66. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,294; see also Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56
F.E.R.C. at 62,021-22 (requiring provision of transmission service within five years of
request).
67. NORTH Am. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 1991-2000, THE
FUTURE OF BULK ELECTRICITY SYSTEM RELIABILITY IN NORTH AMERICA 23 (1991) [hereinafter
NERC, RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT]. Delays in transmission siting and construction are not un-
common. According to the NERC report, one transmission line between Baltimore and
Washington, D.C. originally planned for completion in 1974 is 20 years behind schedule. Id.;
see also NORTH Am. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 1990 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 28-29 (1990)
(reviewing other cases where construction of transmission lines was delayed due to variety of
factors).
68. TRANSMISSION TASK FORCE, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY CoMM'N, THE TRANsMIs-
1993] ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY 559
3. Transmission access conditions only imposed after limits established on
FERC's authority to order wheeling
Interestingly, FERC only imposed open access conditions in
merger cases after efforts to order wheeling based on section 211
were frustrated and the severe limits of that authority became appar-
ent.69 Prior to the realization of these limits, FERC had not insisted
on attaching open access transmission conditions to merger re-
quests. 70 In fact, the reason FERC provided for rejecting a request
that a proposed utility merger be conditioned on acceptance of
open access transmission service obligations was that the agency
had authority under sections 211 and 212 to order wheeling to rem-
edy anticompetitive practices. 7' FERC relied on the potential use of
this remedial authority when it found that "the merger has had and
appears to have no potential effect on the availability of wheeling
service." 72 This approach evaporated with FERC's growing appre-
ciation of the limited nature of its authority under sections 211 and
212.
4. FERC has imposed transmission access conditions beyond those
necessary to mitigate mergers' anticompetitive effects
FERC is authorized by section 203 of the FPA to condition the
approval of a merger that, but for such conditions, would not be
consistent with the public interest.73 Although FERC may impose
conditions requiring mitigation of a proposed merger's likely an-
ticompetitive effects, the agency is not authorized to impose condi-
tions that are not directly related to specific adverse effects.
74
SION TASK FORCE'S REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 39-43 (1989) (discussing difficulty in ex-
panding transmission systems and providing anecdotal evidence of transmission construction
problems), According to the report, the time needed to complete a transmission project
ranges widely from 8 months to 16 years. Id. at 42. Moreover, because the report noted that
only half the projects are completed within two to four years, FERC was well aware that many
transmission system expansion projects would take longer than five years to construct. Id.
69. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text (describing limits of FERC's authority
to order wheeling under § 211).
70. See Union Elec. Co., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,394, at 61,875 (1983) (rejecting request by
municipal agencies that proposed merger be conditioned on acceptance of general wheeling
tariff on grounds that FERC possessed adequate authority under §§ 211 and 212 of FPA to
order utility to accept wheeling tariff), aff'd sub nom. City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887
F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1989).
71. See Union Elec. Co., 26 F.E.R.C. 61,184, at 61,442, aff'd sub nom. City of Malden v.
Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that FERC could remedy future an-
ticompetitive practices through its authority to order wheeling).
72. Id.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 824b (1988); see also supra notes 42-43 (discussing FERC authority in
§ 203 of FPA to condition mergers).
74. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,012 (acknowledging FERC
§ 203 power to condition mergers is limited because conditions must be consistent with pub-
lic interest and remedy anticompetitive effects of merger), reh g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340
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Despite FERC's acknowledgment that its conditioning power under
section 203 is limited in this fashion, 75 the agency has not permitted
this limitation to hamper its pursuit of open access. In Utah Power &
Light, Commissioner Trabandt cautioned against FERC's overreach-
ing the proper bounds of its section 203 authority. 76 Later, in North-
east Utilities, he expressed his belief that FERC had, in fact, exceeded
those bounds. 77 Commissioner Trabandt also voiced suspicion that
FERC's true goal in imposing transmission access in merger cases
was not the mitigation of anticompetitive effects, but the promotion
(1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 161,089 (1992); Utah
Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,282 (recognizing limitations on FERC author-
ity to impose common-carrier conditions in merger cases), clarified, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh 'g
granted, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,500 (1988), reh'g granted in part, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209 (1989), enforced,
51 F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v.
FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
75. Northeast Utils. Ser. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,012 (stating that "[t]he Commission may
impose conditions only to the extent needed to make a proposed merger consistent with the
public interest").
76. Utah Power & Light Co., 47 F.E.R.C. at 61,756-59 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting).
Commissioner Trabandt warned FERC against improperly using its power to condition merg-
ers as a mechanism by which to impose open access transmission service obligations on utili-
ties, as follows:
We must not make merger cases platforms from which to launch probes in generic
transmission policy. Nor must we use these adjudications as opportunities to
restructure the electric utility industry along more competitive lines, as by weakening
the franchise monopoly, say, in the interests of efficiency. Rather, we must inquire
whether the merger will bring about anti-competitive effects and we must apply rem-
edies limited to lessening, if not altogether eradicating, those effects.
... [A]ny conditioning pursuant to section 203(b) intended to mitigate any future
adverse effect of the proposed merger on the existing competitive situation must be
directly and rationally related to such a specific adverse effect. There must be a direct
nexus between the form and substance of the condition imposed by the Commission
and the prospective adverse effect on the existing competitive situation found by the
Commission and sought to be mitigated. The Commission, in my judgment, clearly
exceeds its statutory conditioning authority under section 203(b) to the extent that
any specific condition does not have such a direct nexus to a specific prospective
adverse effect. As a result, the form and substance of the condition must demonstra-
bly be designed to mitigate that adverse effect and nothing more. A 'close' nexus, an
indirect relationship or a partially rational relationship would all fail to meet the stat-
utory test.
That conclusion is supremely important in the area of transmission access and
wheeling, because, but for the merger application, the Commission would not other-
wise have the requisite legal authority to impose these conditions. Thus, as a matter
of law, the direct nexus of the specific condition to a specific adverse effect is the
absolutely mandatory legal predicate for the Commission's authority to impose a
transmission access condition of any kind, and conversely, the absence of such a di-
rect nexus would be a totally fatal legal flaw in the Commission's order. And, again,
all of the analysis of any alleged adverse effect on the existing competitive situation,
and the statutorily required direct nexus to any resulting condition must be estab-
lished with substantial evidence on the record of that case.
Id.
77. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,054, 62,058 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dis-
senting) (stating that FERC exceeded its § 203 authority by imposing wheeling conditions
beyond those necessary to mitigate potential anticompetitive effects of proposed merger).
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of competitive forces.78
a. Narrower transmission conditions would mitigate any likely
anticompetitive effects
In both Utah Power & Light and Northeast Utilities, FERC held that
the transmission access conditions imposed were "minimum neces-
sary" concessions to alleviate the proposed mergers' likely anticom-
petitive effects.7 9 In Utah Power & Light, however, equally effective,
albeit narrower, transmission conditions existed that would have
mitigated the only anticompetitive effects identified by FERC that
actually arose from the proposed merger.80 FERC found that the
merger posed a threat to competition because "the merged com-
pany could give preference to its own generation over that of com-
petitors . . . (even when the latter is cheaper)." 81 Rather than
prescribing a narrow remedy requiring the merged company to
wheel for any lower-cost rival supplier, FERC required the company
to open its entire transmission system to access by competitors.
8 2
Similarly, the transmission access conditions imposed in Northeast
Utilities were broader than necessary to alleviate the anticompetitive
effects of that merger. Although FERC acknowledged that its exam-
ination of the anticompetitive effects of the merger focused on cer-
tain "strategic or key transmission facilities," 83 FERC required the
merged company to open its entire transmission system to competi-
tor access, and not merely these strategic facilities. 84
78. See Utah Power & Light Co., 47 F.E.R.C. at 61,758 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting)
(arguing that "[t]he merger application ... does not constitute a regulatory 'blank check'
whereby the Commission has carte blanche to impose any and all conditions deemed appropri-
ate as a matter of general policy with regard to competition in the electric utility industry").
79. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,012 (holding that FERC
may impose only conditions necessary to make proposed merger compatible with public inter-
est), reh'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as
moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,289-
95 (asserting that short-term obligation to provide, upon request, access to remaining existing
capacity and long-term obligation to provide, upon request, firm wholesale transmission ser-
vice at cost-based rates are minimum necessary conditions to prohibit merged company from
foreclosing transmission access to competitors), clarified, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh 'gganted, 45
F.E.R.C. 61,500 (1988), reh'g granted in part, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209 (1989), enforced, 51
F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v.
FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
80. See Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,288 (identifying extraction of monopoly
profits through refusal to wheel low-cost power and giving of preference to utility's own gen-
eration over that of competitors as anticompetitive harms).
81. l
82. See id at 61,291 (compelling merged company to provide nondiscriminatory access
to transmission facilities).
83. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,005 (scrutinizing use of key transmis-
sion facilities that controlled flow of power between northern and southern New England and
that could potentially be used to isolate other electrical generators).
84. Id at 62,021-22, 62,024.
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b. Rjection of "due diligence" standard is unrelated to mitigation of
market power over transmission
FERC's rejection of a due diligence standard for evaluating utility
refusals to satisfy wheeling requests8 5 is at odds with court decisions
recognizing that it is not anticompetitive for utilities to refuse to sur-
render facility use for the benefit of third parties if such use would
result in economic harm to their customers. 86 Similarly, with re-
spect to electric transmission facilities, the courts have held that it is
not anticompetitive for a utility to prefer to use its transmission ca-
pacity for the benefit of its customers.8 7
It is axiomatic that a due diligence standard is sufficient to prevent
the exercise of market power in transmission because nonsatisfac-
tion of a wheeling request would only be excepted if it resulted from
the influence of external forces such as the denial of necessary per-
mits and approvals by state and local agencies,88 delays due to litiga-
tion,8 9 or the requirements of state or federal environmental and
public lands laws. 90 In short, a due diligence standard assures that
85. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (describing FERC's rejection of due
diligence standard in Northeast Utilities).
86. See, e.g., Illinois v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1484, 1486 (7th Cir.
1991) (approving company's refusal to employ open access gas transportation policy that
would have exposed customers to take-or-pay liability because "[m]onopolists needn't acqui-
esce to every demand placed upon them by competitors ... [because] a monopolist's duties
are negative-to refrain from anticompetitive conduct-rather than affirmative-to promote
competition"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1169 (1992); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources
Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 368-69 (9th Cir.) (accepting economic inefficiency as sufficient justification
for utility to refuse to expand refinery), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Olympia Equip. Leas-
ing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "it is clear
that a firm with lawful monopoly power has no general duty to help its competitors"), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1133, 1138
(7th Cir.) (noting that access to "essential facilities" may be denied when such access is not
economically feasible or is not in public interest), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
87. See City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,336,
at 65,342 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting antitrust complaint based on lack of transmission access,
because monopolist has no unqualified duty to cooperate with business rival.), aft'd in part and
rev'd in part, 955 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir, 1992); Cities of Anaheim v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.,
1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,246, at 64,910 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (dismissing claim by munici-
palities that denial of transmission access violated antitrust law as "lacking in substance"),
aff'd, 955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992).
88. See OTA, WHEELING AND DEALING, supra note 14, at 201-06 (describing difficulty of
obtaining transmission siting permits from state and local agencies).
89. See NERC, RELIABILrrY ASSESSMENT, supra note 67, at 24 (noting that judicial chal-
lenges have resulted in delays and cancellations of planned expansions of transmission
systems).
90. See OTA, WHEELING AND DEALING, supra note 14, at 206-08 (discussing requirements
for permitting transmission across federal, state, and tribal lands). A number of federal stat-
utes contain requirements that may prevent or make impractical the expansion of transmis-
sion capacity. See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-470 (1988)
(authorizing Interior Secretary to acquire, manage, and operate property deemed to have
historic or archaeological significance); Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988)
(designating "wilderness areas" that must remain undeveloped); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (restricting development of designated rivers
562
1993] ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY 563
the subject of a wheeling request will make a good faith effort to
expand its transmission system. Nevertheless, since FERC's "Utah
Hammer" will fall despite good faith efforts to expand transmission
facilities, 91 the agency has created an affirmative duty for transmit-
ting utilities to aid third parties.
c. Reassignment promotes competition rather than mitigates
anticompetitive effects of mergers
Another condition imposed by FERC is a requirement that the
transmitting utility honor the resale or reassignment of capacity
from an eligible utility to other utility or nonutility electric genera-
tors.92 This requirement extends beyond FERC's proper exercise of
section 203 authority because it is designed to promote competition
rather than mitigate any anticompetitive effects caused by a mer-
ger.93 Because there is no direct nexus with the anticompetitive ef-
fects to be mitigated, the reassignment condition is an improper ex-
ercise of FERC's authority to approve mergers.
B. FERC Has Imposed Transmission Access Through
Its Ratemaking Authority
Another vehicle FERC employs to impose its open access trans-
mission policy is the use of utility bids for market-based pricing of
and adjacent lands); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988), as
amended, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (West Supp. 1991) (providing for management of coastal
development to protect natural resources); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1544
(1988) (authorizing regulation of land and water use to protect endangered species); Rivers
and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988) (restricting development on and obstruction of navi-
gable waters); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1988) (authoriz-
ing strict compliance standards to abate water pollution caused in part by utility companies).
91. See supra notes 57-58, 62-65 and accompanying text (describing impact of "Utah
Hammer" and rejection of due diligence exception).
92. Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,295, clarifled, 45 F.E.R.C.
61,132, reh'g granted, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,500 (1988), reh'g granted in part, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209
(1989), enforced, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Environmental
Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
93. During arguments before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Environmental Action, FERC implied that by imposing the resale and reassignment of
capacity requirement, it intended to promote competition. Environmental Action, Inc. v.
FERC, 939 F.2d 1057, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting petitioner's claim that failure to re-
quire non-firm wheeling would allow merged company to exercise monopoly control in bulk
power markets, and accepting FERC's argument that resale and reassignment of capacity
would "bring into the market many new participants with the ability to sell non-firm service"
in competition with petitioner). It was for this reason that Commissioner Trabandt criticized
the resale and reassignment mandate in Utah Power & Light: "To require wheeling [when a
merged company exercising due diligence has failed to wheel due to circumstances beyond its
control] crosses the line between remedying anticompetitive effects of the merger and remov-
ing a barrier to a more competitive electric utility industry generally. While one may want
that as a matter of policy, the law does not allow us to impose such a requirement." Utah
Power & Light Co., 47 F.E.R.C. at 61,764 (affirming resale and reassignment requirements pre-
viously imposed by FERC) (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting).
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wholesale power sales. FERC initiated this policy with a flexible
pricing experiment in bulk power transactions that is known as the
"Southwest Experiment." 94 This experiment was followed by a
broader test in the Western Systems Power Pool, which permitted
flexible pricing for not only bulk power sales but also transmission
services. 95 These experiments led, through a number of cases, to
FERC's development of a market-based pricing policy.96
94. See Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,469, at 62,029-31 (1983) (approving
experiment designed to produce electricity at "lowest possible cost"). Under the "Southwest
Experiment," utilities made transmission services more openly available to competitors to
create a more competitive market, and in return had the pricing flexibility to sustain this com-
petitive market. Id. at 62,029. The heart of the experiment was pricing flexibility, or a depar-
ture from cost-of-service ratemaking. Id at 62,049. Such a departure is justified when "a
legitimate policy objective would be served," such as lowering rates charged consumers
through spurring "potentially strong competitive forces." Id. at 62,050. In FERC's view,
"[t]he final, and absolutely essential, ingredient is pricing flexibility." Id. The most common
departure from cost-based ratemaking recognized by FERC is split savings rates, where the
price is set midway between the seller's cost of production and the cost that the buyer saves by
not producing the electricity on its own system. l. at 62,049. In this manner, the buyer and
seller "split" the savings. Id. Flexible pricing can take other forms, however, and in Public
Service Co. of New Mexico FERC approved a price band bounded by an average cost of economy
energy and average cost of firm power. Id. Utilities were permitted to retain some of the
profits resulting from these bulk power trades. Id
95. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 61,242 (1987) (authorizing experiment
intended to promote efficiency by providing energy service and transmission access on volun-
tary basis), modified, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,121 (1989), modified, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,339 (1990), modified
sub nom. Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. 161,099, at 61,319 (rejecting further extension
of pricing experiment for bulk power because applicants had failed to mitigate market power
in generation or transmission), granting stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh'g granted in part, 55
F.E.R.C. 61,495, appealfiled, No. 91-1404 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1991), modified, 59 F.E.R.C.
61,249 (1992).
96. See United Illuminating Co., 60 F.E.R.C. 61,214, at 61,734 (1992) (approving re-
quest for market-based rates because utility lacked market power); Entergy Servs. Inc., 59
F.E.R.C. 61,369, at 62,418 (1992) (rejecting market-based rates because applicant failed to
mitigate market power in transmission); Ocean State Power II, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,360, at
62,337-38 (1992) (finding absence of affiliate abuse and approving rates on market basis);
Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 1 61,234, at 61,752-53 (1992) (accepting market-based rates
for bulk power sales); Central Maine Power Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,200, at 61,816-17 (approv-
ing agreements for various short-term transactions priced at market-based rates), modified on
other grounds, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,083 (1991); Boston Edison Co. Re: Edgar Elec. Energy Co., 55
F.E.R.C. 61,382, at 62,167 (1991) (rejecting proposed market-based wholesale rates be-
cause applicant failed to show absence of potential for self-dealing); Cleveland Elec. Illumi-
nating Co., 55 F.E.R.C. 61,172, at 61,553-54 (1991) (approving market-based rates for
transaction between utilities because seller lacked market power over generation or transmis-
sion in relevant markets); Nevada Sun-Peak Ltd. Partnership, 54 F.E.R.C. 61,264, at 61,769
(denying request for market-based rates because applicant had not proved it lacked market
power in generation), reh 'ggranted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,058 (1991); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
53 F.E.R.C. 61,145, at 61,503 (1990) (accepting market-based rates for coordination sales
and transmission services upon utility's acceptance of transmission access conditions);
Dartmouth Power Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 53 F.E.R.C. T 61,117, at 61,359-60 (1990) (af-
firming market-based rates because applicant lacked market power in generation or transmis-
sion); Terra Comfort Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,241, at 61,837, 61,841-42 (1990) (denying
request for market-based rates because applicant did not demonstrate lack of potential for
abuse in self-dealing, absence of market power in generation, or lack of market power in
transmission); Enron Power Enter. Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. 1 61,193, at 61,708-09, 61,711 (1990)
(accepting market-based rates because no potential existed for self-dealing and applicant
lacked market power over generation and transmission); TECO Power Servs. Corp., 52
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In cases involving utility affiliates, FERC requires applicants to
demonstrate that (1) no potential exists for anticompetitive abuse
through self-dealing on the part of affiliates, 97 and (2) the applicant
F.E.R.C. 61,191, at 61,697-700 (1990) (rejecting request for market-based rates for pro-
posed transactions because applicant failed to demonstrate lack of potential for abuse
through self-dealing or mitigation of market power over generation and transmission); Com-
monwealth Atl. Ltd. Partnership, 51 F.E.R.C. 1 61,368, at 62,244-46 (1990) (affirming mar-
ket-based rates because no potential for self-dealing abuse was present and applicant was not
dominant supplier and neither owns nor operates any transmission facilities other than inter-
connection capacity in relevant market); Public Serv. Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367, at
62,226 (approving request for market-based rates because applicant lacked market power
over generation in relevant region and had mitigated market power over transmission by of-
fering long-term transmission access at cost-based rates), modified sub nom. PSI Energy, Inc., 52
F.E.R.C. 61,260 (reducing term of open access commitment from 20 to 10 years), clarified,
53 F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990),petition dismissed sub nom. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC,
954 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Portland Gen. Exch., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,108, at 61,245-46,
61,248 (rejecting request for market-based rates because applicant failed to eliminate poten-
tial for preferential pricing in sales from utility parent to affiliate, but approving alternative
request because applicant lacked market power over generation and transmission), clarified, 51
F.E.R.C. 61,379, enforced, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,216 (1990); Chicago Energy Exch., Inc., 51
F.E.R.C. 61,054, at 61,112 (1990) (approving market-based rates because applicant did not
own generation facilities or control transmission facilities directly or indirectly); National
Elec. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,378, at 62,157 (1990) (accepting market-
based rates for power brokering because no potential for self-dealing abuse existed, and be-
cause applicant lacked market power because it owned no generation or transmission facilities
and was not affiliated with any entity that controlled transmission facilities); Doswell Ltd. Part-
nership, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,251, at 61,757 (1990) (approving request for market-based pricing
because applicant was not dominant in generation and was not directly or indirectly in control
of transmission facilities); Torco Energy Mktg., Inc., 48 F.E.R.C. 61,294, at 61,947-48
(1989) (affirming market-based rates for power brokering because applicant controlled no
generation or transmission facilities); Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 F.E.R.C. 1 61,210, at
61,776-78 (1989) (approving market-based rates for "power marketer" because there was no
potential for self-dealing and applicant lacked market power over generation or transmission);
Ocean State Power, 44 F.E.R.C. 61,261, at 61,981-84 (1988) (accepting market-based rates
because no evidence of self-dealing existed, applicant lacked market power over generation,
and applicant did not own or control transmission capacity); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 44
F.E.R.C. 61,010, at 61,050-53 (1988) (approving market-based rates for coordination ser-
vice upon acceptance of open access transmission conditions); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 42
F.E.R.C. 1 61,406, at 62,196-97 (accepting market-based rates for firm transactions because
applicant mitigated market power over transmission through voluntary acceptance of open
access conditions, and reserving approval of market-based rates for coordination services
upon utility's acceptance of transmission access conditions), clarfied, 43 F.E.R.C. 61,403
(1988); Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 42 F.E.R.C. T 61,012, at 61,029 (1988) (approving
market-based rates for purchase from independent power producers because sellers lacked
market power over generation or transmission); Howell Gas Management Co., 40 F.E.R.C. 1
61,336, at 62,025 (1987) (accepting market-based rates for "power marketer" because appli-
cant did not own generation, transmission, or distribution facilities); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38
F.E.R.C. at 61,804-05 (approving experiment in market-based pricing for both wholesale sales
and transmission services because such pricing would serve objectives of FERC in administer-
ing FPA, and because prospective benefits of plan outweighed potential for anticompetitive
exercise of market power); EUA Power Corp., 36 F.E.R.C. T 61,017, at 61,039 (1986) (ac-
cepting market-based rates as part of settlement of purchase of additional share of nuclear
power plant); Citizens Energy Corp., 35 F.E.R.C. 61,198, at 61,456 (1986) (accepting mar-
ket-based rates for non-profit marketing organization because applicant did not own or oper-
ate generation or transmission facilities); Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,469, at
62,059-60 (1983) (approving pricing experiment in bulk power transactions).
97. See Ocean State Power II, 59 F.E.R.C. at 62,338 (approving utility affiliate's request for
market-based rates because of evidence of "lack of affiliate abuse"); Edgar Elec. Energy Co., 55
F.E.R.C. at 62,167 (rejecting proposed market-based rate for sale from affiliate to parent be-
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lacks market power in the electric generation and transmission mar-
cause applicant failed to show absence of potential for preferential rate treatment of affiliates);
Terra Comfort Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. at 61,837 (denying request for market-based rates for sale
from affiliate to parent in part because applicant's proposal ignored sale of services between
affiliates); TECO Power Serus. Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. at 61,697-99 (rejecting request for market-
based rates for proposed sale from parent to affiliate in part because of existence of financial
incentives to offer rates more favorable to affiliates than to other market participants); Portland
Gen. Exch., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C. at 61,245-46, 61,248 (rejecting request for market-based rates
because applicant failed to justify different rates to affiliate and nonaffiliate for substantially
similar services).
The concern regarding self-dealing, or a transaction between a utility and an affiliated in-
dependent power producer, is that a utility will reap excessive profits either (1) by overpricing
purchases from unregulated affiliate power producers, see Ocean State Power II, 59 F.E.R.C. at
62,337 ("In particular, when a seller like Ocean State II is seeking market-based prices for
sales to one or more affiliated traditional utilities, our concern is that the transfer price-the
price the seller charges its affiliated buyers for the seller's power-is too high."); Edgar Elec.
Energy Co., 55 F.E.R.C. at 62,167-68 (discussing prospect that utility "unduly favored the rates
offered by its affiliate seller over lower rates offered by other nonaffiliate sellers"), or (2) by
underpricing sales to affiliates. See Portland Gen. Exch., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C. at 61,244-45 (stating
that utility has incentive to charge affiliated marketer "as low a price as possible"). In this
manner, the utility parent can earn higher profits than allowed by state and federal regulators.
See Edgar Elec. Energy Co., 55 F.E.R.C. at 62,168 (noting that utility may favor affiliate in
purchase not subject to cost-of-service regulation "because the higher profits can accrue to
the seller's shareholders"); Portland Gen. Exch., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C. at 61,244 ("Affiliates may have
the incentive to engage in such preferential transactions because they share common corpo-
rate goals-profits for stockholders that own both entities. This common interest creates the
incentive to maximize profits to the affiliated marketer by having the selling utility charge the
affiliated marketer as low a price as possible."); see also 1 KAHN, supra note 3, at 28 (noting that
regulated companies can extract monopoly profits by paying excessive prices to affiliated,
unregulated companies); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 548, 605 (1969) (stating that regulated firms have incentive to "evade the constraints of
regulation" through affiliate transactions).
In fact, FERC's concern over the potential for abuse in self-dealing is so strong that ap-
proval of requests for market-based rates by utilities or their affiliates has essentially been
restricted to sales to nonaffiliates. See Central Maine Power Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 61,816-17 (ap-
proving agreements for various short-term sales to nonaffiliates priced at market-based rates);
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 55 F.E.R.C. at 61,553-54 (approving market-based rates for
sales to nonaffiliated utilities because seller lacks market power over generation or transmis-
sion in relevant markets); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. at 61,503 (approving market-
based rates for coordination sales and transmission services by investor-owned utility to
nonaffiliated municipal authority); Commonwealth All. Ltd. Partnership, 51 F.E.R.C. at 62,245-46
(approving request for market-based rates by affiliate of California utility located in Virginia
for sales of electricity to Virginia utility); Public Serv. Co. of nd., 51 F.E.R.C. at 62,226 (approv-
ing request for market-based rates for sales to nonaffiliated utilities); Portland Gen. Exch., Inc.,
51 F.E.R.G. at 61,245-46, 61,248 (approving market-based rates for sales by investor-owned
utility to municipalities); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,050-53 (approving market-
based rates for sales of coordination services to nonaffiliate); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 42
F.E.R.G. at 62,196-97 (accepting market-based rates for firm transactions and conditioning
approval of market-based rates for sales of coordination services to nonaffiliate); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,804-05 (approving experiment in market-based pricing for both
wholesale sales and transmission services among utilities); EUA Power Corp., 36 F.E.R.C. at
61,039 (accepting market-based rates for sale by utility to nonaffiliated utilities); Public Serv.
Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. at 62,059-60 (approving pricing experiment in bulk power transac-
tions among four nonaffiliated utilities). But see Ocean State Power II, 59 F.E.R.C. at 62,337-38
(approving market-based rates for sales by utility affiliated to parent companies based on evi-
dence of "lack of affiliate abuse"); Ocean State Power, 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,981-84 (conditioning
affirmance of market-based rates for sales from affiliate to parent companies upon showing of
lack of abuse in self-dealing).
FERC has not absolutely ruled out the prospect of allowing market-based rates for sales
between a utility and an affiliate, however. In Edgar Electric Energy Co., FERC identified three
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kets.98 The former showing is necessary to demonstrate that the
proposed rate for an affiliate transaction does not violate the FPA by
being unduly preferential or discriminatory because of self-deal-
ing,99 and the latter showing is needed to prove that the proposed
rate is just and reasonable. 100 Based on its past approach to re-
quests for market-based pricing, FERC will likely proceed with a
pricing rulemaking' 0 1 that will include, as a safe harbor require-
ment, acceptance of an open access transmission tariff by utilities
and their affiliates.'
0 2
factors that demonstrate a lack of affiliate abuse. Edgar Elec. Energy Co., 55 F.E.R.C. at 62,168
& n.63. The first factor is whether the affiliate competed directly with a nonaffiliate in a for-
mal solicitation or an informal negotiation process. Ia at 62,168. FERC weighed this factor
in Nevada Sun-Peak, where it rejected a request for market-based rates in part because there
was no bid. Nevada Sun-Peak Ltd., 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,769. The second factor is whether the
price is comparable to what nonaffiliated buyers in the relevant market are willing to pay for
similar services. Edgar Elec. Energy Co., 55 F.E.R.C. at 62,168-69. In TECO Power Services,
FERC rejected the applicant's assertion that the requested rate was not unduly preferential in
part because there had been no public offer to determine market value. TECO Power Servs.
Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. at 61,699. FERC also rejected the application in Portland General Exchange
because the rate for the proposed sale to a utility affiliate was below fully allocated cost. Port-
land Gen. Exch., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C. at 61,245. The third factor is whether a benchmark compari-
son demonstrates that the price and nonprice terms of the proposed affiliate transaction are
comparable to those of sales by nonaffiliated sellers. Edgar Elec. Energy Co., 55 F.E.R.C. at
62,169. In Edgar Electric Energy Co., the applicant relied on this third approach, but FERC held
that the evidence did not show that the rates requested were just and reasonable. Id.
Although the application was rejected, FERC stressed that "our action today should not be
interpreted as barring all affiliate transactions where market-based rates are requested" and
similarly does not establish a rule barring affiliate transactions at market-based rates. Id. at
62,170-71. The agency proved to be as good as its word in Ocean State Power I, where it
approved a request for market-based rates based on benchmark evidence of the market value
of both price and nonprice terms of the proposed transaction. Ocean State Power II, 59
F.E.R.C. at 62,337-38 (relying on benchmark evidence to conclude there was no abuse of self-
dealing).
98. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (discussing market power test to elec-
tric generation and transmission).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (1988).
100. Id. § 824d(a).
101. See Martin L. Allday, Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Pre-
pared Remarks at the Edison Electric Institute (Nov. 4, 1991) (on file with The American Univer-
sity Law Review) (announcing that FERC intends to develop rulemaking on market-based
pricing policy). According to Chairman Allday, "I think it's time to go beyond the case-by-
case approach [to market-based pricing]. The industry needs generic guidance and the cer-
tainty that guidance brings. We're developing a [Notice of Proposed Rulemaking] to do just
that." Id.
102. See id (describing need for acceptance of transmission access tariff in FERC's ap-
proval of market-based rates proposed by utilities and their affiliates). According to Chairman
Allday,
I propose that we offer APPs [affiliated power producers] and IOUs [investor-owned
utilities] ... at least one safe harbor. In my mind the best safe harbor, and the one
that would most speed our review, would be an acceptable open access tariff. That
tariff would have to cover at least the relevant part of the transmission system be-
longing to the APP, the IOU, or their affiliates.
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1. FERC has broad discretion to set rates for wholesale power sales and
transmission services
Historically, wholesale rates approved by FERC under FPA sec-
tion 205 authority have been based on suppliers' costs of service. 
0 3
The FPA does not limit FERC to cost-based methodologies, how-
ever, and the courts have deferred to the agency's reasoned choice
regarding ratemaking methods.' 0 4 For this reason, FERC has wide
discretion to consider a variety of factors in determining whether a
rate is just and reasonable. FERC has used this discretion to incor-
porate a "zone of reasonableness" standard' 0 5 into its examination
of market-based pricing proposals.
10 6
103. See supra note 8 (discussing principles of utility rate regulation).
104. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1989) (refusing to adopt
constitutional standard for ratemaking because standard would unnecessarily foreclose alter-
natives that could benefit both consumers and investors); FERC v. Pennzoil Producing Co.,
439 U.S. 508, 517-19 (1979) (reversing Fifth Circuit decision vacating FERC order because
decision encroached on agency's broad ratemaking discretion); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S.
380, 387-90 (1974) (recognizing wide discretion afforded FPC in rulemaking); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 306-10 (1974) (noting that Court will only reverse FPC orders
when orders' results are arbitrary); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968)
(stating that courts lack authority to set aside rates that lie within "zone or reasonableness");
Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 309 (1963) (rejecting challenges to ratemaking methodolo-
gies used by agency because "no single method need be followed by the Commission in con-
sidering the justness and reasonableness of rates"); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 602 (1944) (declaring that FPC is not bound to use any single formula or combination of
formulas to calculate rates); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1177
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that FERC may establish any ratemaking methodology that assures
rates fall within "zone of reasonableness" bounded by investors' interest against confiscation
and consumers' interest against exorbitant rates); Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC,
734 F.2d 1486, 1501-09 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing broad discretion granted FERC but vacating
order because order lacked reasoned basis), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
105. See Jersey Cent. Power &Light Co., 810 F.2d at 1177 (stating that "zone of reasonable-
ness" is "bounded at one end by the investor interest against confiscation and at the other by
the consumer interest against exorbitant rates") (quoting Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker,
188 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1950)); Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 734 F.2d at 1502 (holding that
FERC may approve rates that fall within "zone of reasonableness" where rates are neither
"less than compensatory" nor "excessive"); City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731. 750-51
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (affirming that rates must be high enough to attract investors but low enough
to prevent exploitation of consumers), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
106. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234, at 61,752-53 (1992) ("In previous
instances in which it has granted market-based rates, the Commission has made an explicit
determination that the rates fell within a zone of reasonableness."); Dartmouth Power Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,117, at 61,360 (1990) (affirming rate because it falls within
legally mandated "zone of reasonableness"); Enron Power Enter. Corp., 52 F.E.R.C.
61,193, at 61,709-10 (1990) (stating that FERC has authority to approve rates within "zone of
reasonableness"); Commonwealth Atd. Ltd. Partnership, 51 F.E.R.C. T 61,368, at 62,246-47
(1990) (maintaining that broad discretion afforded FERC permits it to accept rates within
"zone of reasonableness"); Public Serv. Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367, at 62,221-27 (de-
claring that rates within "zone of reasonableness" are "just and reasonable"), modified sub nom.
PSI Energy, Inc., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,260, clarified, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990), petition dismissed
sub nom. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Chicago En-
ergy Exch., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,054, at 61,112 (1990) (stating that market-based rate must
fall within "zone of reasonableness" to meet FERC approval); National Elec. Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,378, at 62,156 (1990) (noting broad discretion enjoyed by
FERC to accept rates that are within "zone of reasonableness"); Doswell Ltd. Partnership, 50
568
1993] ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY 569
2. Efforts to use ratemaking authority to order wheeling directly have been
rejected by the courts
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States,10 7 which held that the FPC lacked an explicit man-
date under the FPA to order wheeling,108 the agency and its succes-
sor attempted to wield ratemaking authority vested in it through the
FPA to require wheeling. In Richmond Power & Light v. FERC,10 9 an
electric utility challenged rates proposed by the FPC for transmis-
sion service because the agency did not mandate wheeling." 0 The
utility argued that the FPC had authority under FPA sections 205
and 206 to condition approval of rates for wholesale power upon a
utility's acceptance of transmission service obligations."' The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explicitly rejected this
argument, declaring that FERC may not do indirectly that which it is
prohibited from doing directly." 2 Other requests to mandate
wheeling through FERC's power to approve rates have also been
rebuffed,1 3 even in the wake of the enactment of PURPA." 4
F.E.R.C. 61,251, at 61,756-57 (1990) (asserting that noncost-based rates fall within "zone of
reasonableness" where applicant lacks or has mitigated market power); Citizens Power &
Light Corp., 48 F.E.R.C. 61,210, at 61,776-77 (1989) (noting that accepted proposed rates
fall within "zone of reasonableness"); Ocean State Power, 44 F.E.R.C. 61,261, at 61,979
(1988) (stating that rates must fall within "zone of reasonableness" to satisfy just and reason-
able standard); Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,012, at 61,028 (1988) (noting
that ratemaking methodology must serve legitimate statutory purpose and produce rates that
fall within "zone of reasonableness"); Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,469, at
62,060 (1983) (declaring that rates charged by utilities in pricing experiment are just and
reasonable because they fall within "zone of acceptability").
107. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
108. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (reviewing legislative history of FPA and
concluding Congress did not grant FPC authority to order wheeling).
109. 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
110. Richmond Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
111. Il at 620.
112. See id- (denying petition to condition approval of wholesale rates upon acceptance of
open access obligations because "[i]f Congress had intended that utilities could inadvertently
bootstrap themselves into common-carrier status by filing rates for voluntary service, it would
not have bothered to reject mandatory wheeling in favor of a call for just such voluntary
wheeling").
113. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting
FERC order requiring electric utility to file wheeling tariff including offer to perform trans-
mission service), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983). The court rejected FERC's order because
it would have involuntarily imposed a duty to wheel on the utility:
The imposition of common carrier status on FP&L, which the orders at issue accom-
plish, is precisely the authority which the FPA denies the Commission. The legisla-
tive history of the FPA makes clear that the Commission lacks the authority to
require electric utilities to provide wheeling even on a reasonable request. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the Commission lacked statutory authority to issue the orders
in question.
Id. at 676. Significantly, the court cautioned that "the Commission must be especially careful
not to overstep its authority and require the involuntary wheeling of electricity, absent com-
pliance with the new §§ 211 and 212 of the FPA." Id at 673.
114. See New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388, 403 (2d Cir. 1980)
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3. Exercise of discretion in ratemaking authority as means to impose
transmission access
Blocked in its efforts to mandate wheeling through its ratemaking
authority, FERC relied on pricing incentives to entice utilities to vol-
untarily provide transmission services.' 5 The initial application of
FERC's section 205 authority to induce utilities to accept transmis-
sion access obligations via pricing incentives is Public Service Co. of
Indiana,'16 in which a utility agreed to provide wheeling on demand
in return for market-based rates for large amounts of firm power.' 
1 7
In essence, FERC has used the prospect of higher profits from mar-
ket-based pricing to encourage utilities to voluntarily provide trans-
mission access.' 18
a. FERC separately measures market power in generation and
transmission
In Doswell Ltd. Partnership,1 9 FERC adopted a three-part test to
measure whether an applicant for market-based rates has market
power over generation or transmission. 120 The first consideration is
(vacating and remanding FERC wheeling order issued under §§ 205 and 206 of FPA to assure
consistency with FPA §§ 211 and 212), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821 (1981). FERC argued that the
wheeling order did not compel wheeling because it merely modified and conditioned an ex-
tant voluntary transmission agreement between the parties. Id. at 400. The court held that
the "effect of the Commission's order will be to increase beyond [New York State Electric &
Gas Corp.'s (NYSEG)] voluntary commitment the amount of power NYSEG is required to
wheel," and that an expansion of wheeling obligations could only be issued consistent with
the requirements of §§ 211 and 212 of the FPA. Id. at 400-01.
115. See Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,469, at 62,029 (1983) (approving flexi-
ble pricing experiment for coordination services). FERC noted that pricing flexibility is the
quid pro quo for provision of transmission services by utilities and is "something we have
limited authority to require." Id. The utilities that participated in the experiment were per-
mitted to retain 25% of the profits resulting from wholesale sales under the flexible pricing
scheme. Id. FERC observed that "[b]ecause ofthe limitations on our power to compel wheel-
ing, an experiment like this probably would be impossible without the[] [utilities'] voluntary
agreement to make transmission services available." Id. at 62,062 n.3.
116. 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367, modified sub nom. PSI Energy, Inc., 52 F.E.R.C. 1 61,260, ciari-
flied, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990), petition dismissed sub nom. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
FERC, 954 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
117. See Public Serv. Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. 161,367, at 62,189-90 (citing utility's com-
mitment to provide open-access firm transmission service), modified sub nom. PSI Energy, Inc.,
52 F.E.R.C. 61,260, clarfied, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990), petition dismissed sub nom, Northern
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The ruling hold that if the utility
failed to satisfy all requests for firm transmission service, FERC could suspend the market-
based rate and order refunds. Id. at 62,196-98.
118. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 50 F.E.R.C. 1 61,339, at 62,002 (1990) (noting that pro-
posed market-based rates exceed cost-based rates by 100%); Public Serv, Co. of N.M., 25
F.E,R.C. at 62,029, 62,054-55 (allowing utilities to retain 25% of profits from market-based
priced sales for shareholders).
119. 50 F.E.R.C. 1 61,251 (1990).
120. See Doswell Ltd. Partnership, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,251, at 61,757-58 (1990) (establishing
three-part test to determine market power); see also United Illuminating Co., 60 F.E.R.C. 1
61,214, at 61,734 (1992) (applying three-part test and approving request for market-based
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whether the applicant directly or indirectly controls transmission fa-
cilities that it could use to prevent market access by competing sup-
pliers.' 21 The second criterion examines whether the applicant is a
"dominant firm in any generating market that might be relevant."' 122
The third element analyzes whether the applicant "controls re-
sources that allow it to erect any other barrier to potential compet-
ing generation suppliers."' 123 Under this test, a seller possesses
market power when the seller can significantly influence price by ex-
cluding competitors from the market.1 24 This three-part test is a
departure from the earlier approach to determining market power
that focused on whether viable alternative sources of electricity were
available to purchasers.' 25 FERC offered no reasoned basis, how-
ever, for departing from its earlier approach and adopting this new
rates); Entergy Servs., Inc., 59 F.E.R.C. 61,369, at 62,417 (1992) (stating that utility appli-
cant must show it lacks or has mitigated market power and is unable to erect or control barri-
ers to entry); Ocean State Power II, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,360, at 62,337-38 (1992) (approving
market-based rate because there is no evidence that affiliates exercised market power or er-
ected other barriers to entry); Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234, at 61,760 (1992)
(concluding, through application of Doswell three-part test, that utility lacks market power);
Boston Edison Co. Re: Edgar Elec. Energy Co., 55 F.E.R.C. 61,382, at 62,167 (1991) (hold-
ing that under Doswell test, seller must present specific evidence to prove that it lacks market
power); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 55 F.E.R.C. 61,172, at 61,552 (1991) (finding that
three elements of Doswell test must be established for seller to demonstrate that it lacks or has
mitigated market power); Nevada Sun-Peak Ltd. Partnership, 54 F.E.R.C. 61,264, at 61,769
(listing elements necessary to prove that market power did not influence rates), reh'g granted in
part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,058 (1991); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. 61,145, at 61,501
(1990) (applying three-part test to weigh market power); Dartmouth Power Assocs. Ltd. Part-
nership, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,117, at 61,359 (1990) (holding that potential seller must meet
three-part test in order to obtain market-based rates); Terra Comfort Corp., 52 F.E.R.C.
61,241, at 61,841 (1990) (setting forth factors examined by FERC to determine whether appli-
cant has market power over generation or transmission); Enron Power Enter. Corp., 52
F.E.R.C. 61,193, at 61,708 (1990) (examining market power through specific evidence of
seller's position and activities); Commonwealth Ad. Ltd. Partnership, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,368, at
62,244 (1990) (listing evidence seller may show to prove lack of market power).
121. Doswell Ltd. Partnership, 50 F.E.R.C. at 61,757.
122. Id at 61,758.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. See Ocean State Power, 44 F.E.R.C. 61,261, at 61,981-82 (1988) (stating that mar-
ket power does not exist where seller cannot deny buyer access to alternative power supply
options); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 44 F.E.R.C. 61,010, at 61,050 (1988) (finding that market
power exists where "alternative suppliers are not present for a prolonged period or additional
transmission access is not provided"); Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,012,
at 61,029 (1988) (stating that independent power producers lacked market power because
they could not deprive utility of opportunity to obtain power from alternative sources); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,406, at 62,197 (holding that market power does not exist
where there are alternative power sources or where applicant provides transmission access),
clarified, 43 F.E.R.C. 61,403 (1988); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 61,242, at 61,795
(1987) (holding that market power is defined by lack of viable alternatives, which need not be
alternative transmission services), modified, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,121 (1989), modified, 50 F.E.R.C.
61,339 (1990), modified sub nom. Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,099, granting stay,
55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,495, appealfiled, No. 91-1404 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 26, 1991), modified, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,249 (1992).
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market power test.
126
b. Market power test has been applied more rigidly to transmission
than to generation
FERC's application of the market power test in the context of
electric transmission has been quite rigid where utilities or their af-
filiates have sought market-based pricing. In fact, despite the
agency's protests to the contrary,' 27 the sole form of mitigation rec-
ognized by FERC in cases involving applicants possessing transmis-
sion market power has been the applicant's acceptance of a
commitment to wheel on demand.' 28 Where FERC found that a
utility or utility affiliate having transmission market power failed to
make an open access commitment, the agency rejected the
126. See Doswell Ltd. Partnership, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,251, at 61,757-58 (1990) (failing to
state reasons for adopting new approach to measuring market power).
127. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 59 F.E.R.C. 61,369, at 62,418 (1992) ("A utility does not
have to have a systemwide open-access transmission tariff on file with the Commission in
order to show that it lacked transmission market power in a particular transaction.").
128. "Wheeling on demand," or an "open access commitment," may encompass the en-
tire transmission system of an applicant provided that the utility offers transmission access at
cost-based rates. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234, at 61,737, 61,753-54 (1992)
(stating that utility may mitigate its market power in transmission by offering transmission
access across its system at cost and on demand); Public Serv. Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. T
61,367, at 62,209, 62,226 (ruling that applicant mitigated its market power over transmission
by offering long-term transmission access on demand), modified sub nom. PSI Energy, Inc., 52
F.E.R.C. 61,260, at 61,968 (reducing term of open access commitment from 20 to 10 years),
clarified, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990),petition dismissed sub noma. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
FERC, 954 F.2d 736, 738-40 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding judicial review precluded because
FERC had not yet authorized any open access transactions).
Alternatively, the open access commitment may be limited to specific transmission corri-
dors that competitors are obliged to use, and need not extend to a utility's entire system. See
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. 61,145, at 61,503 (1990) (approving application for
market-based rates for coordination and transmission services upon acceptance of utility's
commitment to provide specified amount of transmission access); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 44
F.E.R.C. 61,010, at 61,044, 61,049-51 (1988) (approving request for market-based rates
upon acceptance of offer to provide transmission service for 206 megawatts); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 42 F.E.R.C. 61,406, at 62,192, 62,196-97 (accepting market-based rates based on
commitment to provide firm transmission service for 176 megawatts), modified, 43 F.E.R.C.
61,403 (1988).
FERC found that some utilities or utility affiliates that controlled transmission facilities
lacked market power in transmission because the transmission systems they controlled were
not in the relevant market. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 55 F.E.R.C, 61,172, at
61,553-54 (1991) (observing that transmission facilities owned and operated by applicant are
located outside relevant market and so utility lacked market power); Commonwealth Atd. Ltd.
Partnership, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,368, at 62,244 n.49 (1990) (noting that geographic remoteness
of utility's transmission lines caused it to lack market power in transmission). Alternatively,
utilities or their affiliates may lack market power because the purchasers have independent
control over transmission resources. See Portland Gen. Exch., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,108, at
61,251 (finding that utility applicant for market-based rate lacked market power in transmis-
sion because municipalities had access to transmission system), clarified, 51 F.E.R.C. T 61,379,
enforced, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,216 (1990); Ocean State Power, 44 F.E.R.C. at 61,982 (noting that
applicant cannot control transmission by denying purchasers opportunity to obtain capacity
from other sources, because purchasers are members of integrated power pool that guaran-
tees them transmission access).
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application.129
Significantly, FERC has applied the market power test more
strictly in cases involving control over transmission than in cases in-
volving control over generation. While FERC has found that a sig-
nificant generation presence in the relevant market does not
necessarily constitute market power, o30 it has reached the opposite
conclusion with respect to control of transmission facilities.' 3 ' In
contrast to cases of market power in generation, the existence in
transmission cases of alternative sources of supply does not warrant
relaxation of rigid application of the market power test. 3 2 That is,
129. See Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,099, at 61,319-20 (rejecting further
extension of bulk power pricing experiment because utility applicants failed to mitigate mar-
ket power in generation and transmission), granting stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh'g granted in
part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,495, at 62,713-14 (upholding portion of earlier decision finding that
applicants failed to mitigate market power), appealfiled, No. 91-1404 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1991),
modified, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,249 (1992); Terra Comfort Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,241, at 61,837-
38, 61,842 (1990) (denying request for market-based rates because applicant did not demon-
strate lack of market power in transmission and lack of potential for abuse in self-dealing);
TECO Power Servs. Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,191, at 61,697 (1990) (rejecting request for mar-
ket-based rates because applicant failed to mitigate market power over transmission and po-
tential for abuse of self-dealing).
130. See Pacfic Gas &Elec. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. at 61,502 (noting that applicant is "not likely to
be able to exercise market power" over buyer, despite possible control of 33% of excess
generation capacity); Public Ser,. Co. of Ind, 51 F.E.R.C. at 62,204-05 (concluding that appli-
cant lacks market power in generation because it controls less than 20% of total generation in
relevant market).
131. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 59 F.E.R.C. at 62,418 (dismissing "the mere existence of alter-
native [transmission] paths" and rejecting utility application for market-based rates); Nevada
Sun-Peak Ltd. Partnership, 54 F.E.R.C. 61,264, at 61,770 (suggesting that market-based
rates cannot be granted if applicant has any market power in transmission), reh'g granted in part,
55 F.E.R.C. 61,058, (1991) (finding that credit agreement provided no basis for review);
Terra Comfort Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. at 61,841-42 (holding that applicant having market power in
transmission had failed to mitigate market power, despite existence of direct interconnections
with six other utilities); TECO Power Servs. Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. at 61,700 (concluding that appli-
cant failed to mitigate market power in transmission because company could still foreclose
access to some potential suppliers). One reason the threshold for demonstrating market
power in transmission is higher than that for generation may be FERC's belief that control of
transmission facilities provides greater opportunity for anticompetitive behavior than does
control of generation facilities. See Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 F.E.R.C. 61,210, at
61,777 (1989) (asserting that "[t]he most likely route to market power in today's electric util-
ity industry lies through ownership or control of transmission facilities").
132. See Nevada Sun-Peak Ltd. Partnership, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,770 (refusing to aver that appli-
cant lacks market power in transmission even though proposed generating plant is located
entirely in service territory of buyer and buyer is directly interconnected with eight utilities
other than parent company); Terra Comfort Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. at 61,841-42 (holding that appli-
cant having transmission control failed to demonstrate lack of market power or mitigation of
market power despite buyers' direct interconnections with six alternative utilities); TECO
Power Servs. Corp., 52 F.E.R.C. at 61,700 (concluding that applicant failed to mitigate market
power in transmission because it "could have foreclosed some potential suppliers" despite
direct interconnections between buyer and other utilities).
In contrast, FERC has held that market power in generation does not exist when the buyer
has alternative sources. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 55 F.E.R.C. 61,172, at 61,553
(1991) (finding that utility applicant for market-based rates lacked market power in generation
because buyer had three alternative sources of power); Portland Gen. Exch., Inc., 51 F.E.R.C.
61,108, at 61,249 (1990) (concluding that utility applicant for market-based rates lacked
market power in generation because buyers had six alternative sources of supply); Ocean
574 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:543
while some control of generation does not constitute market power,
any control over transmission facilities gives rise to market power.
This strict approach represents a sea change from FERC's earlier
attitude toward market power over transmission133 and illustrates
FERC's determination to wield its discretionary authority to compel
acceptance of open access. Significantly, the FERC definition of
market power in transmission defies the definition of market power
used by the courts 134 and the U.S. Department of Justice 135 under
antitrust law, which holds that market power only exists where a
company controls a large market share. Moreover, the Antitrust Di-
vision of the U.S. Department of Justice disputes the FERG ap-
proach. It held that "[a] supplier does not have market power in the
relevant market for delivered power to a particular purchaser if
there are alternatives equally or better situated to supply that
State Power, 44 F.E.R.C. 61,261, at 61,981 (1988) (holding that affiliate applicant lacked
market power in generation because buyer had 25 other options).
133. In Pacific Gas &Electric, FERC rejected an appeal for imposition of open access condi-
tions in a pricing experiment specifically because there were viable alternative transmission
paths. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 61,242, at 61,795 (1987) (defining monopoly
power as involving "lack of viable alternatives"), modified, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,121 (1989), modi-
fled, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,339 (1990), modified sub noam. Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. V
61,099, granting stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh 'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,495, appeal
filed, No. 91,1404 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1991), modified, 59 F.E.R.C. 1 61,249 (1992). FERC
indicated that "many Participants would be able to receive transmission service from more
than one transmission owner," and maintained that market power only existed when a trans-
mission owner could foreclose all alternative sources of electricity. Id. at 61,791, 61,795.
134. The courts have defined market power as "the ability of a single seller to raise price
and restrict output," Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503
(1969) (providing definition of market power under antitrust law), and held that "the exist-
ence of such power ordinarily is inferred from the seller's possession of a predominant share
of the market." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2081
(1992) (defining market power on basis of market share). The courts have held that market
power only exists where the seller controls a predominant share of the market. See, e.g., East-
man Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2088 (holding that control of nearly 100% and between 80-95%
of two related markets creates presumption of market power); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-27 (1984) (concluding that 30% market share does not establish
market power); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1966) (stating that control
of 52% of market constitutes dominant market position); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
384 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1965) (holding that control of 24%o of market may create market power
under some circumstances); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 459-61
(1963) (concluding that 22% market share constitutes dominant market position); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 278 (1963) (stating that control of 387 of
market sufficed to establish dominant market position); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1962) (finding that 30% market share presents threat of market
dominance); Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612-13 (1952) (concluding that
control of 40%7 of market does not constitute market power); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 518.3c (Supp. 1990) (stating that it would be rare
that firm with only 25-50%o of market could control price for any significant period without
substantial cooperation from other firms).
135. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMNI'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 2.211 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (establishing presumption that
market power may exist when firm has 35% market share); U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, VERTICAL
RESTRAINT GUIDELINES § 5.3 (1985), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,105 (stating
that market power does not exist where company controls less than 30% of market share).
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purchaser." 136
Further, FERC has indicated that it views market power in trans-
mission to be an overarching measure of market power. In Entergy
Services,' 3 7 FERC suggested, for the first time, that market power in
generation may be excused through mitigation of market power in
transmission. 13 8 Entergy controlled virtually all installed and excess
generating capacity in certain markets13 9 and dominated the bulk
power market in most of the rest of its service area.140 Yet, despite
Entergy's unquestioned market power in generation, FERC refused
to reject its rate request, insisting that the utility's open access plan
ensured that potential buyers would have sufficient alternatives to
Entergy to fill their energy needs.' 4 1
In effect, this result signalled FERC's abandonment of the Doswell
three-part test 42 in favor of the earlier test of market power, which
focused on whether viable alternative energy sources were avail-
able. 143 This willingness to apply different market power tests in
different circumstances suggests that FERC will select the test that
permits it to expand open access, because use of the Doswell test in
Entergy Services would have resulted in FERC's rejection of the rate
request due to Entergy's market power in generation. When
equipped with a vehicle to promote its goal of open access, however,
FERC instead selected the market power test that permitted it to
approve the utility's request. By concluding that Entergy may miti-
gate market power in generation through open access, FERC argua-
136. See Memorandum from Robert D. Willig, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department ofJustice, & Margaret Guerin-Calvert, Assistant Chief, Economic Regulatory Sec-
tion, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, to Gene C. Schaerr, Associate Counsel to
the President, Office of the White House 2 (July 11, 1991) (discussing definition of market
power in assessing requests for market-based rates) (on file with The American University Law
Review).
137. 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234 (1992).
138. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234, at 61,758-60 (1992) (approving mar-
ket-based rates for wholesale power sales and noting that "[w]ithout the proposed transmis-
sion tariffs, Entergy clearly dominates, or has some market power over, nearly three-quarters
of the first-tier entities in the relevant geographic markets identified by the Commission as to
both installed and excess capacity"). Yet, FERC concluded that Entergy was unlikely to pos-
sess market power because of the company's acceptance of a transmission tariff based on the
tariff approved by the agency in Public Service Co. of Indiana. Id. at 61,759 & n.82.
139. See id. at 61,759 n.80 (calculating that Entergy controlled greater than 99% of in-
stalled and 98% of excess generating capacity in eight geographic areas in its service area).
140. See id (revealing that Entergy controlled between 23-45% of installed generating
capacity in eight other geographic areas and between 21-51% of excess capacity in 10 mar-
kets). Entergy's control of installed capacity dropped below 20% in three areas, and control
of excess capacity was less than 15% in only one market. Id.
141. Id at 61,759.
142. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (outlining three-part test to measure
whether applicant for market-based rates has market power).
143. See supra note 125 (reviewing market power test applied by FERC before three-part
test was established in Doswell).
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bly found application of the market test in transmission to be the
truer test of market power.144
c. Market power test in transmission has been tightened
Over time, FERC has tightened the market power test in transmis-
sion. While in early cases the agency suggested that transmission
market power constituted the ability to prevent access to all compet-
ing suppliers,1 45 the standard was raised in Nevada Sun-Peak Ltd.
Partnership 14 6 to sanction utilities that do not "adequately mitigate[]
any ability to block the buyer from reaching other sellers."147 Some
members of the Commission speculate that the real reason FERC
rigidly applies the market power test in transmission is to compel
acceptance of open access conditions by utilities.' 48 It is quite clear
144. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234, at 61,759 (1992) (holding that neigh-
boring utilities will have alternative supply options as result of Entergy's adoption of transmis-
sion tariff based on open access).
145. See Doswell Ltd. Partnership, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,251, at 61,757 (1990) (stating that
market power in transmission is ability to prevent buyers from reaching competing suppliers).
146. 54 F.E.R.C. 1 61,264, rehk'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,058 (1991).
147. Nevada Sun-Peak Ltd. Partnership, 54 F.E.R.C. 61,264, at 61,769 (emphasis ad-
ded) (redefining market power in transmission to mean ability to prevent access to any other
potential sellers), reh'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,058 (1991). Commissioner Moler has
expressed concern over the tightening of the standard for market power in transmission. See
id. at 61,781 (Moler, Comm'r, dissenting) (asserting that redefined market power test will be
"virtually impossible" because it requires seller to demonstrate that it has mitigated any abil-
ity to block buyer from reaching other sellers). FERC's adoption of the new test of market
power in transmission constitutes a rejection of FERC's earlier definition of market power,
employed to rule that market power does not exist where competitors "have access to the
market and can supply more of their own service quickly enough to provide customers with an
alternative." Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 F.E.R.C. 61,210, at 61,777 (1989) (maintain-
ing that market power is ability to bar access of buyer to competing sellers).
148. See Public Serv. Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367, at 62,233 (1990) (Trabandt,
Comm'r, dissenting in part) ("[Olur regulatory jurisdiction under sections 205 and 206 of the
[FPA] give [sic] us neither authority to compel electric utilities to open (or close) their trans-
mission systems, nor the power to 'improve the market.' "), modified sub nora. PSI Energy, Inc.,
52 F.E.R.C. 61,260, clarified, 52 F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990),petition dismissed sub nom. Northern
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Citizens Power & Light Co., 48
F.E.R.C. 61,210, at 61,783-84 (1989) (Trabandt, Comm'r, concurring) (suggesting that logi-
cal result of FERC's holding is requirement of open access transmission service as precondi-
tion for approval of market-based rates for sales by utilities and their affiliates).
Commissioner Trabandt, dissenting in Nevada Sun-Peak, noted that "[o]he might conclude
that part of the fault with Sun-Peak lay not only with Nevada Power's procurement, but also
with the failure of [Southern California Edison Company] to open its transmission to all com-
ers." Nevada Sun-Peak, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,777 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting). But see id. at
61,782 (Langdon, Comm'r, concurring) (disavowing that order makes any findings with re-
spect to transmission).
Commissioner Trabandt stated his concern even more bluntly in Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,
53 F.E.R.C. 61,145, at 61,497 (1990), where FERC conditioned approval of a utility's re-
quest for market-based rates on acceptance of open access transmission conditions:
Today the Commission strikes yet another blow for a more open transmission sys-
tem. In the opinion of the majority, greater access remains a prerequisite for creat-
ing a more competitive market for electricity in the United States (or at least
northern California). Those who believe that the slogan "open transmission access"
will intensify from a drumbeat to a roaring thunder as it rolls down the landscape
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that FERC intends to impose open access transmission service obli-
gations as a quid pro quo for its approval of utilities' market-based
rate requests for wholesale power sales.'
49
d. FERC concedes open access cannot be imposed on utilities that lack
any market power
In United Illuminating Co.,1 50 the bounds of the transmission access
policy developed in the market-based rate cases were established.
Initially, FERC rejected the request for market-based rates by
United Illuminating Co. on the grounds that the utility had failed to
mitigate market power in transmission through submission of an
open access tariff.15 Significantly, the U.S. Department of Justice
intervened in the case and requested rehearing on the basis that
"the Commission is simply without statutory authority to require
open access as a quid pro quo for its approval of lawful competitive
market-based rates" where the applicant lacked market power.
52
The Justice Department maintained that United Illuminating cannot
exercise market power because it had no ability to affect the price of
bulk power.' 53 On rehearing, FERC conceded that United Illumi-
nating "did not have significant market power with respect to gener-
will, no doubt, find much to cheer in this order.... According to that school of
thought, the Commission here, as it should, takes every opportunity to create the
"Brave New World."
Id. at 61,509 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting).
149. See Martin L. Allday, Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Pre-
pared Remarks at the DOE/NARUC Meeting (Sept. 30, 1991) (on file with The American Uni-
versity Law Review) (containing explicit statement that FERC will use open access transmission
service obligations as express condition for approval of market rates). Chairman AlIday's re-
marks are as follows:
The biggest hurdle in getting quick FERC approval [for market rates for wholesale
power sales] is and will continue to be market power in transmission. Control of
transmission lets sellers shut out competitors and can prevent buyers from getting to
the lowest available cost supply source .... I believe we should presume [electric
utilities] have mitigated market power-as long as they have an acceptable open ac-
cess transmission tariff on file with the FERC. That tariff must cover at least those
lines that the buyer might need to reach other suppliers.
Id.
150. Priv. Ltr. Rul. ER92-397-000 (F.E.R.C.July 2, 1992) (on file with The American Univer-
sity Law Review), rev'd, 60 F.E.R.C. 61,214, at 61,734 (1992).
151. See United Illuminating Co., Priv. Ltr. Rul. ER92-397-000 (F.E.R.C. July 2, 1992)
(rejecting application for market-based rates because utility had not filed open access tariff)
(on file with The American University Law Review), rev'd, 60 F.E.R.C. 1 61,214, at 61,734 (1992)
(approving request for market-based rates because applicant lacked significant market power).
152. See Request of the United States Department of Justice for Rehearing at 14-15,
United Illuminating Co., Priv. Ltr. Rul. ER92-397-000 (F.E.R.C. July 2, 1992) (requesting
rehearing on grounds that FERC exceeded its authority in demanding open access commit-
ment by utility that lacked market power).
153. See id. at 8-9 ("TheJuly 2 Order fails to address the uncontroverted evidence in the
applications that [United Illuminating] cannot exercise market power with respect to the
transmission at issue ... [because] it has no ability to affect the price of bulk power paid by
UNITIL [Power Corp.].").
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ation" and approved the rate request.1 54 The United Illuminating
case suggests that only those utilities that lack any indicia of market
power in generation or transmission may obtain market-based rates
without accepting open access obligations.
III. BEYOND THE PALE: TRANSMISSION ACCESs CONDITIONS
IMPOSED BY FERC ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE FEDERAL
POWER ACT
FERC's aggressive promotion of competition came at the expense
of its statutory responsibilities under the FPA and, indeed, ran
counter to the public interest.1 55 Before being amended by the En-
ergy Policy Act of 1992,156 the FPA charged FERC with a number of
important duties beyond the promotion of competition. The open
access conditions imposed by FERC through its merger and rate au-
thority are inconsistent with its duty to promote energy conserva-
tion 157 and efficiency,158 to protect the interests of native load
customers, 159 to observe limitations on mandated wheeling that al-
low for coordination services, 160 and to assure reliability of electric
154. See United Illuminating Co., 60 F.E.R.C. at 61,734 (accepting market-based rates be-
cause applicant lacked market power). In its rehearing order, FERC conceded that United
Illuminating's small transmission system is completely encircled by the system of a larger
neighboring utility. Id
155. FERC does not have unfettered discretion under the FPA to promote public welfare,
but is bound by the constraints in its enabling statutes. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 699-71
(1976) (rejecting petition for FPC rulemaking to prohibit discriminatory employment prac-
tices because discouragement of discrimination is not policy goal incorporated in FPA). The
Supreme Court observed in NAACP v. FPC that "the use of the words 'public interest' in a
regulatory statute is not a license to promote the general public welfare. Rather, the words
take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation." Id. at 669. Cf. American Paper
Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 404, 417 (1983) (holding that FERG
did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in promulgating rule that "requires electric utilities to
purchase electric energy from cogenerators and small producers at a rate equal to the
purchasing utilitfies'] fully avoided cost"); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 749-50 (1982)
(rejecting challenge to FERC regulations promulgated under PURPA because FERC has juris-
diction over interstate electric sales and regulations were consistent with basic purpose of
PURPA).
156. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721-722, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915-
19 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-824k) (amending §§ 211-212 of FPA).
157. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a(a), 2611(1) (1988).
158. Id. § 824a(a), 2611(2).
159. Id § 824k(a)(l). This subsection was deleted by the Energy Policy Act. Energy Pol-
icy Act of 1992, § 722(1), 106 Star. at 2916 (amending § 212 of FPA). The interests of native
load customers, however, are protected by the transmission pricing provisions of the Energy
Policy Act. Id.; see infra notes 231-45 and accompanying text (discussing transmission pricing
provisions of revised § 212 of FPA).
160. See 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a)(1)-(4) (obligating FERC to demonstrate that wheeling order
will not unduly burden utility). Such requirements implicitly constitute a limit on mandated
wheeling that encourages voluntary coordination. One court, in construing the requirements
that FERO must meet before issuing a wheeling order, noted that even when all prerequisites
for the issuance of a mandatory wheeling order are met, "the Commission is instructed to
issue a proposed order so as to allow the parties themselves an opportunity to agree on terms
and conditions." New York Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388, 402 (2d Cir. 1980).
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service. 161
In Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. FERC,162 a utility petitioned
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to
review the rate order that FERC issued in Public Service Co. of Indi-
ana,'63 on the ground that the wheeling requirements in the order
imposed costs on the petitioner's native load customers and de-
graded reliability. 164 The court did not resolve this issue, however,
concluding instead that the claims in the petition were not yet ripe
for judicial review165 and that the utility retained the right to chal-
lenge individual transmission service agreements in the future. 66
FERC's single-minded pursuit of a mandatory transmission access
policy has caused it to ignore its implicit obligation under the FPA
to promote voluntary provision of transmission services. 67 FERC's
omission became particularly clear in Western Systems Power P001,168
where the agency's insistence on imposing transmission access con-
ditions drove the applicants to withdraw their voluntary commit-
ment to provide transmission services.' 6 9 Ironically, Western
Subsection (a) was deleted by the Energy Policy Act. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 722(1), 106
Stat. at 2916 (amending § 212 of FPA).
161. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j(a)(2)(C), 824k(a)(3) (1988). These subsections were deleted by
the Energy Policy Act. Energy Policy Act of 1992, §§ 721-722, 106 Stat. at 2915-19.
162. 954 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
163. 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367, modified sub nom. PSI Energy, Inc., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,260, clari-
fled, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990), petition dismissed sub noma. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
FERC, 954 F.2d 736, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
164. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 736,737 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (reviewing
basis of challenge by utility to wheeling conditions in Public Service Co. of Indiana rate order).
Reliability is "[t]he ongoing ability of a power system to avoid outages and continue to supply
electricity with the appropriate frequency and voltage to customers." See OTA, WHEELING
AND DEALING, supra note 14, at 264 (defining reliability of electric power systems); see also
KELLY ET AL., supra note 54, at 266 (defining reliability as "[t]he degree of assuredness with
which the utility provides uninterrupted service to customers").
165. Northern Ind Pub. Serv. Co., 954 F.2d at 738-40.
166. Id at 740.
167. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) ("Congress re-
jected a pervasive regulatory scheme for controlling the interstate distribution of power in
favor of voluntary commercial relationships."); S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1935) (indicating that imposition of duty on public utility to transmit energy is not preferable
to voluntary coordination of electric facilities). In Northeast Utilities, FERC seemed to concede
that a voluntary commitment by the applicants would result in increased wheeling, yet the
agency rejected the voluntary offer made by Northeast Utilities. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56
F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,012 (finding that utility's voluntary commitments did not adequately
mitigate anticompetitive effects of proposed merger), reh'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340
(1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
168. 55 F.E.R.C. 61,099, granting stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, modified, 55 F.E.R.C.
61,495 (1991).
169. See Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,099, at 61,302-03 (describing volun-
tary commitment by applicants to provide transmission service to eligible utilities), granting
stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,495, at 62,715 (accepting
withdrawal of applicants' voluntary commitment to provide transmission services), appealfiled,
No. 91-1404 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1991), modified 59 F.E.R.C. 61,249 (1992). The applicants
had agreed to implement long-term firm transmission service principles, called the "Exhibit C
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Systems' voluntary commitment comprised the most innovative and
promising transmission proposal put forward by utilities to date. 170
A. Transmission Access Conditions Imposed by FERC Subordinate Duty
To Promote Conservation and Efficiency
1. FERC has a duty to promote conservation and efficiency
The FPA and PURPA charge FERC with promoting energy effi-
ciency and conservation.'71 This duty extends to the agency's lim-
ited grant of authority to order wheeling, because a wheeling order
could only issue if it would "conserve a significant amount of en-
ergy"'172 and "significantly promote the efficient use of facilities and
principles," idt at 61,302-03, but FERC chose to reject this voluntary commitment. Id. at
61,317-19. FERC found insufficient evidence to prove that under the agreement market
power would be adequately distributed among the participants. Id. at 61,319. After listing its
market power-related objections to the arrangement, FERC rejected the agreement without
considering the possibility of further improvements in the proposal. See id. at 61,320 ("The
... exhibit C principles represent the strongest transmission commitment that the transmis-
sion owners were willing to make. Therefore, we see little benefit in conditioning our ap-
proval on modifications .... "). In dissent, Commissioner Trabandt pointed out that the
majority had expressed only two valid concerns, both of which could be adequately addressed
through modifications to the agreement. Id. at 61,338 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting).
FERC's review of the Exhibit C principles should have been based on a determination of
whether they would result in any increase in wheeling, not whether the brand of transmission
access championed by FERC would result in even more wheeling. As a result of FERC's
refusal to compromise, the participants in the Western Systems Power Pool withdrew their
voluntary commitment to provide transmission services. Id. at 62,715. Commissioner Tra-
bandt expressed dismay over the lost opportunity to encourage voluntary wheeling:
[T]he majority, in rejecting [Western Systems Power Pool's offer], has seriously set
back genuine progress in the name of ideological purity. Most glaring, as a result of
imposing cost-based rates, the Commission must now agree to WSPP cancelling its
transmission commitments. Even if WSPP could have done better (I agree they did
the best they could), all must admit they represented a large concession by utilities
toward voluntarily opening their systems....
Moreover, today's decision in an immediate sense makes the generation market
less competitive....
[The Commission] lets pass, and perhaps pushes away, the moment to en-
courage a more competitive electric industry.
Id. at 62,721-22 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting).
170. Cf. idt at 62,721 (Trabandt, Comm'r, dissenting) (expressing view that Western Sys-
tems' voluntary commitment would make great strides toward serving public interest by facili-
tating purchase of cheaper electricity by consumers).
171. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1988) (charging FERC with responsibility of"assuring an abun-
dant supply of electric energy throughout the United States with the greatest possible econ-
omy and with regard to the proper utilization and conservation of natural resources"). FERC
has a similar duty to promote efficiency under PURPA. See id. § 2611 (l)-(2). The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that FERC is charged with effecting
electric generation "at the lowest possible cost to the consumer in the long run-in the econ-
omist's terms, to insure the efficient performance of an industry in which the normal forces of
competition are for one reason or another not equal to the task." NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d
432, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 662 (1976). See generally Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (stating that basic goal of government regulation is
to "achieve the most efficient allocation of resources possible").
172. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a)(2)(A) (1988). This subsection was deleted by the Energy Policy
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resources."173 By contrast, until enactment of the Energy Policy Act
of 1992, Congress did not authorize FERC to order wheeling in or-
der to promote competition. 174
2. Encouraging economy transactions is wholly consistent with FERC's
duty to promote efficiency
FERC remained well within FPA statutory authority when it ap-
proved several experiments in the 1980s regarding market-based
pricing for wholesale power sales. 175 The experiments were
designed to enhance energy efficiency through promotion of econ-
omy transactions. 76 Economy transactions, also termed economy
transfers, are short-term purchases that are made by utilities be-
cause the cost of purchased power is less than that of self-generated
power.177 FERC correctly equates the promotion of economy trans-
Act. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721(2), 106 Stat. 2776, 2915 (to be
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j) (amending § 211 of FPA).
173. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a)(2)(B). This subsection was deleted by the Energy Policy Act.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721(2), 106 Stat. at 2915 (amending § 211 of FPA).
174. See Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 25 F.E.R.C. T 61,204, at
61,534 (1983) (examining legislative history of FPA §§ 211 and 212 and concluding that "the
essential compromise [in the Conference Committee Report regarding the FPA] was that the
House prevailed on having a wheeling provision in the bill to conserve energy while the Sen-
ate prevailed on not using wheeling to increase competition"); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1750,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7797, 7826 ("The conferees do
not intend that the Commission order wheeling which significantly alters the competitive rela-
tionship among utilities in competition with one another for the same customers."). Congres-
sional intent to deny FERC authority to mandate wheeling in order to promote competition in
bulk power markets is made plain in a reading of § 211 (c)(1) of the FPA. Section 211 (c)(1) of
the FPA clearly stated that "[n]o order may be issued by the Commission under subsection (a)
of this section unless the Commission determines that such order would reasonably preserve
existing competitive relationships." 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c)(1) (1988). This subsection was de-
leted by the Energy Policy Act. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721(4)(A), 106 Stat. at 2915
(amending § 211 of FPA). One of the reasons Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act and
expanded FERC authority to order wheeling was to spur competition in wholesale power sales
among utilities and between utilities and nonutilities. See infra note 220 and accompanying
text (discussing Congressional intent in enacting Energy Policy Act).
175. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 61,242, at 61,789 (1987) (accepting pro-
posed experiment in flexible pricing for wholesale power sales and transmission because ex-
periment is consistent with FERC's FPA-imposed duty to encourage efficiency), modified, 47
F.E.R.C. 61,121 (1989), modified, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,339 (1990), modified sub nom. Western Sys.
Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,099, at 61,315-19 (rejecting flexible pricing for bulk power
because applicant had failed to mitigate market power in generation and transmission), grant-
ingstay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,495, at 62,713-15 (reassert-
ing prior rejection of flexible pricing experiment), appealfiled, No. 91-1404 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26,
1991), modified, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,249 (1992); Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,469, at
62,032-33 (1983) (approving experiment in flexible pricing for coordination services because
of potential for furthering FPA goal of promoting efficiency).
176. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,789 (noting that purchasing electricity
from other utilities is factor in achieving efficiency); Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. at
62,033 (emphasizing that trading of coordination services promotes efficiency through more
effective allocation of resources and lower costs).
177. See OTA, WHEELING AND DEALING, supra note 14, at 263 (defining economy
transfers).
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actions and coordination services with its statutory duty to en-
courage efficiency. 178 FERC is also statutorily obliged to encourage
greater levels of voluntary coordination among electric utilities,17 9
and the agency has recognized the relationship between this duty
and its responsibility to promote efficiency.' 80 Yet, the priority ac-
corded firm transmission over nonfirm wheeling has the effect of
discouraging coordination services because such services are allo-
cated the lowest priority among competing uses of the system.
3. Transmission access conditions imposed by FERC subordinate economy
transactions to firm wheeling
Although FERC has recognized that its duty to promote efficiency
coincides with the encouragement of economy transactions, the ef-
fect of its open access policy is to subordinate economy trades to
firm transmission. 18' Moreover, FERC has demonstrated a marked
preference for commitments to long terms of transmission service.
While economy transactions take place with terms as short as
hours, 8 2 FERC has imposed terms of service of up to twenty
years.' 8 3 FERC's subordination of economy transactions to firm
third-party wheeling may compel utilities with constrained transmis-
sion systems to abandon economy transactions and thus forfeit effi-
ciency gains.
178. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,789 (asserting that "rational regulatory
policy" requires encouraging utilities to engage in bulk power trades that coordinate re-
sources and thus lead to efficiency gains).
179. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1988) (dividing U.S. into regional districts to promote vol-
untary interconnection and coordination of electric generation and transmission facilities).
180. See supra notes 175-76, 178 and accompanying text (noting FERC's encouragement
of economy transfers to promote efficiency).
181. FERC has expressly subordinated economy transactions to firm wheeling on behalf
of third parties. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,020 ("[Flirm trans-
mission service should be accorded priority over non-firm service, even if the latter would
otherwise benefit native load customers."), reh 'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified,
58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992); Utah Power & Light
Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,294 ("[T]he merged company's obligation to serve shall
include a requirement that the merged company reduce its own off-system transactions to the
extent necessary to meet all requests for [firm] transmission service by electric utilities."),
clarified, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh "granted, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,500 (1988), reh 'g granted in part, 47
F.E.R.C. 61,209 (1989), enforced, 51 F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
182. See KELLY Er AL., supra note 54, at 288 (noting that term of short-term transaction
may be as short as one day).
183. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,034 (requiring utility to offer transmis-
sion service for 20 years or for term of power supply contract, whichever is longer); Public
Serv. Co. of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367, at 62,193-94 (approving 20-year term for transmis-
sion service), modified sub nom. PSI Energy, Inc., 52 F.E.R.C. 61,260, at 61,968 (reducing
term for transmission service from 20 to 10 years), clarified, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,131 (1990), peti-
tion dismissed sub nom. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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B. Transmission Access Conditions Fail to Protect Native Load Customers
1. Federal Power Act protects native load customers from economic harm
attributable to wheeling
Section 212(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the FPA provided that FERC could
not issue a wheeling order unless it determined that such an order
was (1) "not likely to result in a reasonably ascertainable uncompen-
sated economic loss of any electric utility" 18 4 or would (2) "not
place an undue burden on an electric utility."' 85 Given this respon-
sibility, concrete determinations that an order would not impose
economic losses or undue burdens on the native load customers of a
wheeling utility should have motivated FERC's decisions, rather
than hope for the uncertain benefits deriving from rising competi-
tion in bulk power markets.
2. Refusal to permit full recovery offorgone benefits imposes economic
burdens on native load customers
FERC recognizes that a transmitting utility incurs opportunity
costs in the form of forgone revenues when the utility alters its
transmission system use to serve third-party requests for wheel-
ing.186 Under the policies established in its Northeast Utilities rehear-
ing order, 187 FERC will permit recovery of opportunity costs in
certain circumstances. FERC embraced the "Staff's Proposed
Transmission Pricing Proposal"' 88 that acknowledged third-party
wheeling may impose increased costs on native load customers 89
184. 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a)(1) (1988). This subsection was deleted by the Energy Policy Act.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 722(1), 106 Stat. 2776, 2916 (to be codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 824k) (amending § 212 of FPA).
185. 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a)(2) (1988). This subsection was deleted by the Energy Policy Act.
Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 722(1), 106 Stat. at 2916 (amending § 212 of FPA).
186. See Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,278, at 61,871 (1992) (noting that utility
may be precluded from engaging in economy sales or purchases due to wheeling activity for
third party); Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, at 61,200-01 ("Opportunity
costs ... are the revenues lost or costs incurred by a utility in providing third-party transmis-
sion service when transmission capacity is insufficient to satisfy both a third-party wheeling
request and the utility's own use."), reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992). One
type of opportunity cost is forgone economy transactions. See Northeast Utils. Senv. Co., 58
F.E.R.C. at 61,201 (noting that utility might incur costs or lose profits by limiting its own off-
system purchases or sales during times of increased electricity demand).
187. See Northeast Utils. Sen,. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,203 (establishing broad pricing goals
that tentatively allow transmitting utility to recover forgone benefits). FERC applied these
pricing goals subsequent to Northeast Utilities. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,873.
188. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,203 (finding that pricing goals in
"Staff's Proposed Transmission Pricing Proposal" are "fully consistent with our statutory re-
sponsibility"). The agency staff developed the pricing proposal, Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 57
F.E.R.C. 61,340, at 62,102-05 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, in preparation for the
rehearing order in Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, at 61,203, reh 'g dismissed as
moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
189. See Northeast Utils. Sero. Co., 57 F.E.R.C. at 62,103 ("When a utility commits a portion
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and concluded that the transmitting utility should recover these for-
gone benefits. 190
Limits are placed on the recovery of forgone benefits under pric-
ing goals adopted by FERC, however. The staff pricing proposal
accepted by the agency in Northeast Utilities established three goals
that will govern transmission pricing:191 (1) "native load customers
of the utility providing transmission service should be held harm-
less"; (2) "transmission customers should be charged the lowest
reasonable cost-based rate for third-party firm transmission ser-
vice"; and (3) "pricing should prevent the collection of monopoly
rents."1 92 FERC maintains that it will determine transmission rates
through a "balance" of these pricing goals, in light of the facts and
circumstances existing at the time.' 93
Clearly, there is tension between the first and second pricing
goals. The goal of charging third-party wheeling customers the
"lowest reasonable cost-based rate" conflicts with that of holding
native load customers harmless. 94 Since Northeast Utilities, FERC
has ordered the lowering of transmission rates designed to hold na-
tive load customers harmless, on the ground that the rates are not
consistent with the goal of charging the lowest reasonable rate for
transmission service.' 95 Because transmission rates will be based on
a balance of these contradictory goals, there is no assurance that
native load customers will be "held harmless." On the contrary,
of its existing transmission system to provide wheeling service to third parties and due to a
lack of capacity availability its system becomes constrained[,] the cost of providing service to
its native load customers may be increased.").
190. See id. (offering opportunity cost pricing as way to compensate utility's native load
customers for lost opportunities to engage in economy transactions). In the rehearing order,
FERC embraced the principle of opportunity cost recovery. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58
F.E.R.C. at 61,203 (expressing disbelief that utility's market power over transmission would
be mitigated by rates that do not fully compensate utility for legitimate and verifiable trans-
mission service costs).
191. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, at 61,203 (establishing transmis-
sion pricing goals), reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 1 61,089 (1992).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,278, at 61,872 (1992) (noting disap-
proval of utilities' proposal to fully recover savings of lost economy transfers and suggesting
that pricing goals established in Northeast Utilities preclude full recovery of opportunity costs,
because full recovery would contravene goal of charging lowest reasonable transmission
rates).
195. See Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,873 (ordering reduction in transmission
rates in order to achieve lowest reasonable rate for firm transmission service). FERC con-
ceded that the transmission rate, jointly submitted by the parties in the case, was designed to
protect native load customers by holding those customers harmless. See idt (finding utility's
goal of ensuring that customers receive same service, priced as if no wheeling occurred, to be
consistent with first pricing goal of holding native load customers harmless). Yet, FERC or-
dered the rate reduced because it "conflict[ed] with the second goal of charging the lowest
reasonable rate for firm, third-party transmission service." Idt
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FERC has stated that it will reject transmission rates that are based
solely on the principle of holding native load customers harmless
for the cost of providing third-party wheeling. 196 For this reason, it
follows that the only native load interest expressly protected by
FERC is reliability, not cost.
FERC recognizes that denial of full recovery of opportunity costs
where transmission systems are constrained provides utilities an
economic incentive to expand their systems. The staff pricing pro-
posal relied on incomplete recovery of forgone benefits incurred
through third-party wheeling to provide utilities an economic incen-
tive to expand their transmission systems. 197 This objective also led
FERC to cap recovery of forgone benefits subsequent to Northeast
Utilities.198 In effect, FERC is using the threat of shifting the cost of
providing third-party wheeling onto native load customers as a club
to encourage expansion of transmission systems.' 99
To be sure, FERC's decision to permit any recovery of opportu-
nity costs incurred through third-party wheeling marks a major de-
parture from previous policy. 200 This policy reversal may have more
196. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089, at 61,162 (1992) (rejecting re-
quest for rehearing of opportunity cost pricing policy because transmission rates "will be
approved only if they properly reflect all three transmission pricing goals, not just the princi-
ple of holding native load customers harmless").
197. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340, at 62,104 (1991) (noting that cap
on recovery of opportunity costs at incremental cost of system expansion provides "an eco-
nomic incentive for the utility to expand its transmission system to recover additional reve-
nue"), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. $ 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 58 F.E.R.C. 1 61,089 (1992).
FERC supported such a cap despite the fact that the pricing proposal acknowledged that
"[lIegitimate opportunity costs occur only when ... there is insufficient transmission capacity
to accommodate" both native load and third-party wheeling. Id. at 62,103. Interestingly,
FERC masked its views on capping recovery of opportunity costs but hinted that this was an
issue that would be raised during consideration of future filings by Northeast Utilities. See
Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,203 (specifying issues Northeast Utilities should
address if it files proposal to recover opportunity costs, including whether opportunity costs
should be capped by incremental expansion costs, whether current wheeling customers
should be treated differently from future customers, and how third parties can be protected
from fluctuations in opportunity costs).
198. See Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,874 (capping recovery of opportunity
costs at estimated or actual expansion costs and explaining that "we find the cap appropriate
.,. because it provides an incentive for the utility to expand its system when it is efficient to do
SO").
199. See Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. $ 61,278, at 61,874 (1982) (warning that fail-
ure to build additional transmission capacity will lead to inability to recover opportunity costs
and will subject native load customers to harm).
200. See Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. $ 61,095, at 61,290 (finding opportunity
cost recovery proposal proffered by applicants to be "overly vague and possibly unworkable"
in that it could allow merged company to "collect monopoly rents associated with a scarce or
constrained resource"), clarified, 45 F.E.R.C. $ 61,132, reh'g granted, 45 F.E.R.C. $ 61,500
(1988), reh'ggranted inpart, 47 F.E.R.C. $ 61,209 (1989), enforced, 51 F.E.R.C. $ 61,295 (1990),
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C.
Cir. 1991). Although the administrative law judge in Northeast Utilities had indicated support
for recovery of forgone benefits, Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. 63,020, at 65,221
(rejecting intervenor requests that recovery of"lost opportunity charges" be precluded), mod-
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to do with the agency's zeal to promote transmission access than a
desire to protect native load customers, however. FERC only
changed its policy on recovery of opportunity costs after it became
apparent that state regulators would disapprove the Northeast Utili-
ties proposed merger, which would have denied the agency a promi-
nent vehicle for development of its open access policy. 20 1 The
desire to promote its transmission access policy may also have per-
suaded FERC to dissemble on whether it would cap recovery of op-
portunity costs. 2
0 2
FERC's true purpose in denying or capping opportunity cost re-
covery seems to lie in a desire to spur state public utility commis-
sions to approve expansions of transmission systems.20 3 FERC's
imposition of an absolute duty to provide transmission service, com-
bined with its refusal to permit full recovery of forgone benefits
from third-party wheeling, provides a powerful incentive for state
public utility commissions to approve expansions of transmission
systems. Otherwise, significant economic costs will accrue to the
customers of a transmitting utility. State regulators recognized this
as an intrusion into their realm of transmission siting and construc-
jfied, 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, reh'ggranted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 1
61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992), FERC deferred its decision on
whether to allow recovery of opportunity costs partly because there was no specific proposal
submitted by the applicant in the case. Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,028.
201. See Request of the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control for Rehearing at
3, Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269 (1991) (threatening to disapprove pending
merger because failure to permit recovery of forgone benefits would expose native load cus-
tomers to "undue economic disadvantage"). One of the demands made by the state regula-
tors was that Northeast Utilities be permitted to recover forgone benefits. Id at 4-5.
202. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, at 61,203 (promising to recon-
sider capping recovery of opportunity costs at incremental expansion costs upon refiling by
Northeast Utilities), reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992). The FERO Staff's
Proposed Transmission Pricing Proposal explicitly provided for capping recovery of opportu-
nity costs, however. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340, at 62,105 (1991)
(noting that capping recovery of opportunity costs at incremental costs of expanding system
"provides an incentive to add capacity when it is economically efficient to do so"), modified, 58
F.E.R.C. 161,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
203. FERC had earlier rejected recovery of opportunity costs for wheeling out of concern
that recovery of these costs by the transmitting utility would eliminate the incentive to expand
transmission capacity. See Northeast Util. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,027 (observing that re-
covery of forgone benefits would provide no incentive to Northeast Utilities to upgrade its
transmission system); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,290 (conceding that opportu-
nity cost pricing for transmission services may "provide a useful measure of the value of
scarce transmission resources," but would provide transmitting utility "no incentive to allevi-
ate the congestion"). FERC's denial of recovery of forgone benefits would encourage state
regulators to approve expansion of transmission siting where utilities could otherwise recover
these costs from state regulators under cost-of-service rate regulation.
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tion,204 an area where FERC has no authority, 205 and accordingly
sought rehearing of the Northeast Utilities order.20 6
C. Transmission Access Conditions Will Impair Reliability
Under the FPA, FERC cannot issue a wheeling order that would
impair the reliability of the utility systems affected by the order.20 7
Yet, the transmission access conditions imposed by FERC are in-
tended to increase the use of existing transmission capacity to the
point of full loading,208 which raises serious concerns about the im-
pact of open access policies on electric system reliability.
20 9
204. See Request of the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control for Rehearing at
23, Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269 (1991). The Connecticut Department of
Public Utility Control (CDPUC) leveled the following charge against the "Utah Hammer":
The CDPUC submits that the entire immutable constraints mechanism, and its at-
tendant subordination of economic transactions for the benefit of native load, is an
undue intrusion into the jurisdiction over transmission siting reserved exclusively to
the states under § 201 of the FPA .... Application of the Utah Hammer in New
England thus overrides legitimate state interests in land use and environmental pro-
tection in order to promote interstate bulk power transactions. It thereby en-
croaches upon authority Congress reserved to the states.
Id. at 23-24.
205. FERC has authority over transmission pricing, but not siting. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-
824e (1988) (discussing setting of rates and charges for transmission service and wholesale
power sales). Furthermore, federal regulation under the FPA "extend[s] only to those mat-
ters which are not subject to regulation by the States." Id. § 824(a).
206. See Request of the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control for Rehearing at
1-2, Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269 (1991) (seeking rehearing of Northeast
Utilities order because of concerns of impact on electric ratepayers).
207. See 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a)(3) (1988) (precluding issuance of wheeling order absent
FERC determination that order "will not unreasonably impair the reliability of any electric
utility affected by the order"). Although this subsection was deleted by the Energy Policy Act,
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 722(1), 106 Stat. 2776, 2916 (to be codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 824k) (amending § 212 of FPA), the new law includes comparable protec-
tion for system reliability. See id. § 721(3), 106 Stat. at 2915 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824j) (barring issuance of wheeling order if FERC finds that "such order would unreasona-
bly impair the continued reliability of electric systems affected by the order.").
208. This is plain in Utah Power & Light, where FERC required the merged company to
calculate its "remaining existing capacity," or transmission capacity not needed to serve its
native load and firm contract customers, and offer all of that capacity to other utilities. See
Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 61,095, at 61,291 (describing customer access to ex-
isting transfer capacity during transition period), clarified, 45 F.E.R.C. 61,132, reh'g granted,
45 F.E.R.C. 61,500 (1988), reh'g granted in part, 47 F.E.R.C. 61,209 (1989), enforced, 51
F.E.R.C. 61,295 (1990), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Environmental Action, Inc. v.
FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991). This procedure could well result in loading of a
merged company's transmission capacity to its full-rated capability. After a merger transition
period, a merged company is required to meet all requests for firm service, displacing its own
economy transactions with firm wheeling on behalf of third parties as necessary. See Northeast
Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,020-24 (holding that company may not give
higher priority to its own use than to requests by third parties when allocating transmission
capacity), reh'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dis-
missed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,294-95
(requiring that merged company reduce its own transactions as necessary to meet electric
utilities' requests for transmission service).
209. See NERC, RELIABILrrY AsSESSMENT, supra note 67, at 21 (stating that it is more diffi-
cult to maintain reliability as transmission loadings increase); KELLY ET AL., supra note 54, at
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Although FERC insists that reliability will not suffer as a result of
the obligations it has placed on transmitting utilities, 1"O no analysis
appeared in Utah Power & Light, Northeast Utilities, or Public Service Co.
of Indiana regarding the impact of open access on reliability.
211
These assurances ring rather hollow in any case because they sug-
gest that FERC can distinguish between reliability and economy
transactions, although the agency concedes that no such bright line
exists. 21 2 Indeed, because many transactions are performed for
both economy and reliability purposes, the distinction is altogether
artificial, and the subordination of economy transactions will likely
impair reliability of service.
IV. FERC's AUTHORITY TO ORDER WHEELING HAS BEEN
AUGMENTED BY AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
POWER ACT
A. National Energy Strategy
In February 1991, the Bush administration proposed a "National
Energy Strategy" (NES) designed in part to promote efficiency in
electric generation by encouraging greater competition in the utility
industry. 21 3 One of the legislative and regulatory reform proposals
50, 58 (indicating that operating transmission lines at or near their theoretical maximum
power transfer capability threatens stability, whereas unused transmission capacity furthers
reliability by backing up other transmission lines as well as generation units). In order to
maintain reliability under normal operating conditions when small unplanned additional cur-
rent or voltage drops disturb the balance of the system, loading should not exceed 85-957o of
the theoretical limit. KELLY ET AL., supra note 54, at 50-51.
210. See Northeast Utils. Seru. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. at 62,021, 62,024 (holding that Northeast
Utilities will not be required to provide firm transmission service to third parties when immu-
table constraints prevent expansion of transmission facilities and wheeling would impair ser-
vice to native load customers); Utah Power &Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,291, 61,294 (affirming
that merged company may refuse wheeling service if satisfaction of wheeling request would
impair reliability of service to native load customers).
211. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,200 (failing to analyze how utilities will
maintain reliability when required to use all existing transmission capacity); Public Serv. Co.
of Ind., 51 F.E.R.C. 61,367, at 62,212 (concluding that reliability problems will not be en-
hanced by open access and may be addressed by current engineering and institutional frame-
work), modified sub nom. PSI Energy, Inc., 52 F.E.R.C. V 61,260, clarfied, 53 F.E.R.C. 1 61,131
(1990), petition dismissed sub nom. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 954 F.2d 736 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); Utah Power &Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. at 61,294 (failing to examine consequences of
open access on reliability when merged company must reduce its own off-system transactions
to meet electric utilities' requests for transmission service).
212. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,200 (noting that "[w]e... recognize the
difficulty in demarcating transmission needed for 'reliability' purposes from transmission
needed for 'economic' purposes"). Significantly, FERC ignored the requests by Northeast
Utilities and intervenors for a definition of "reliability" to clarify the meaning of this excep-
tion. Id at 61,197, 61,199.
213. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 31-32 (1991) [hereinafter NA-
TIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY] (stating that NES proposals will allow greater competition in elec-
tric power industry, which will "ensure economic efficiency and provide the flexibility
necessary to manage uncertainty").
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recommended by the Bush administration was the expansion of
open access for wholesale buyers and sellers and the pricing of
wheeling to assure increased efficiency. 2 14 The NES offered no spe-
cific legislation with respect to transmission access, 215 but rather
proposed that FERC fully utilize its existing statutory authority to
expand transmission access and properly price transmission ser-
vice.216 During congressional consideration of energy legislation,
however, administration officials expressed increased support for
legislative expansion of FERC's authority to order wheeling.
217
B. Energy Policy Act of 1992
Congress enacted broad energy legislation in 1992218 that sharply
214. See id. at 7-8, 32, 35 (explaining policy of using existing FERC and Department of
Energy authority to expand access to transmission facilities and to properly price transmission
services). Greater access also would increase competition in wholesale markets, thus guaran-
teeing access to electricity at the lowest reasonable cost. Id. at 35.
215. See H.R. 1301, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 570, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991)
(failing to include amendments of §§ 211 and 212 of FPA in NES implementing legislation
sent to Congress by Bush administration).
216. See NATONAL ENERGY STRAEGY, supra note 213, at 32, 35. The NES recommended
enhanced transmission access, but reserved judgment on whether legislation was needed:
Under the National Energy Strategy, the Administration supports fall utilization of
Department of Energy and FERC authorities to encourage more open access to elec-
tric transmission facilities for traditional utility and other suppliers of electric power,
while maintaining reliability standards. The Administration also supports efforts by
FERC to promote efficient pricing of transmission services. These actions will help
to develop a competitive generation sector and to increase the flexibility of providers
of electricity. Under the Federal Power Act, FERC can establish policies that pro-
mote these objectives. The Strategy recommends that FERC review its existing poli-
cies and programs and reexamine its authority under the Federal Power Act to
ensure that transmission services and facilities are adequate for the emerging com-
petitive generation market. If experience shows that FERC's authority is inadequate, then the
Strategy recommends legislative expansion of FERC's authority.
Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
217. Before markup of energy legislation in the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Sec-
retary of EnergyJames Watkins expressed administration support for transmission legislation
that was consistent with certain principles. Letter from James D. Watkins, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Energy, to Rep. Carlos Moorhead, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee
on Energy and Power, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 27, 1991) (on file with The Ameri-
can University Law Review) (discussing support of Bush administration for transmission legisla-
tion that incorporates certain principles and stating opposition to Committee Print of
"Electricity Policy Act," draft legislation prepared by Subcommittee Chairman Phil Sharp, (on
file with The American University Law Review). One of the principles advocated by the Depart-
ment of Energy is that transmission access legislation "[e]ncourages the emerging competi-
tive market in generation by creating an affirmative obligation for utilities to provide
transmission service." Id. Later in the legislative consideration of H.R. 776, the "Energy
Policy Act of 1992," Secretary Watkins reaffirmed administration support for transmission
legislation that incorporated certain principles. Letter from James D. Watkins, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Energy, to Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, U.S. House of Representatives 12-13 (Sept. 8, 1992) (stating preferences on transmis-
sion access provisions of H.R. 776) (on file with The American University Law Review).
218. President Bush signed H.R. 776, the "Energy Policy Act of 1992," into law on Octo-
ber 24, 1992. President's Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 28 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 2094-95 (Oct. 24, 1992) [hereinafter President's Statement]. The legisla-
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expands FERC's power to order wheeling. The electricity reform
provisions of the "Energy Policy Act of 1992"' 219 are intended to
promote greater competitiveness in bulk power markets 220 in order
to lower rates for consumers. 22 1 The bill's sponsors shared FERC's
view that transmission access may be a barrier to enhanced competi-
tion in wholesale power markets 222 and removed many of the re-
tion had been approved by the sweeping margin of 363 to 60 in the House, 138 CoNG. REC.
HI 1,450-51 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (roll call vote no. 474), and by voice vote in the Senate.
138 CONG. REC. S17,658 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).
219. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721-722, 106 Stat. 2776,
2915-19 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j-824k) (expanding FERC authority to order
wheeling).
220. See President's Statement, supra note 218, at 2095 ("There is much that is good for
America in this new law. It contains a landmark provision furthering competition in the way
electricity is generated and sold, thus lowering prices while ensuring adequate supplies."); see
also 138 CONG. REC. H 1,428 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("Ulti-
mately, as a result of [Title VII] we should see a more competitive industry, lower costs and
reliable service to electricity customers."); 138 CONG. REC. H11,380 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992)
(statement of Rep. Bliley) ("Transmission lines are the highways of commerce in the electric
utility industry. Fair and open access to these lines is essential to fulfill the purposes of the
electricity title of this legislation: The promotion of competition and the lowering of electric
rates.").
Representative Sharp echoed these thoughts in the House debate:
H.R. 776 will also introduce historic changes to the electricity industry-increasing
competition among suppliers and providing protections for consumer pocket-
books.... The final product, a true compromise, is a stronger statement than either
the House or Senate bill of the Congress' desire to see competition in the generation
of electricity and the availability of access to the Nation's transmission grid for all
comers without regard to monopoly or market power.
138 CONG. REC. HI 1,400 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Sharp). Senator Dole
also praised the bill:
We are entering a brave new world of new competition that will be stimulated by the
provisions of this bill. This new age of independent power producers that will now
be able to build, own, and operate power plants and sell electricity on a wholesale
basis to utilities and municipalities anywhere in the United States, will certainly
change the electricity generation business in the future.
138 CONG. REC. S17,632 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Dole).
221. See 138 CONG. REC. S17,649 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Conrad)
("The increased competition that will result from these changes [in the Energy Policy Act] will
lead to reduced utility costs, and the Department of Energy estimates that it will save $1.8
billion per year"); 138 CONG. REC. S17,638 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Cochran) ("Under the conference agreement, consumers will benefit from the competition in
the electric utility industry that will result from the deregulation of powerplant construction
and power distribution."); 138 CONG. REC. S17,628 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Riegle) ("Title 7 is intended to accomplish a restructuring of the utility industry to promote
greater competition for the benefit of energy customers."); 138 CONG. REC. HI 1,436 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) ("We have opened the door today to competi-
tion.... We have opened the door in effect to consumers getting cheaper electrical power
and having a better supply of electrical energy for America."); 138 CONG. REc. HI 1,408 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) ("[iTihis legislation would reform the regula-
tion of electric utilities to ensure competition in both the generation and transmission of
wholesale electric supplies.... Under this legislation, we enter into a new era of competition
in wholesale electricity supplies."); 138 CONG. REC. HI 1,380 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (state-
ment of Rep. Bliley) ("[Tihere are great benefits to allowing competition into the wholesale
electric generating industry. The Department of Energy estimates that full-fledged competi-
tion will bring savings of nearly $3 billion per year.").
222. See National Energy Strategy (Part 4): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of
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strictions on FERC's wheeling authority in sections 211 and 212 of
the FPA.223
1. Protection of native load customers
The Energy Policy Act includes provisions that are intended to
protect the native load customers of affected utilities against undue
harm from the provision of transmission services. Under the stat-
ute, no wheeling order can issue unless FERC finds that it (1) per-
mits the wheeling utility to recover all costs incurred in connection
with the transmission service;2 24 (2) is otherwise in the public inter-
est;225 and (3) does not "unreasonably impair the continued reliabil-
ity of electric systems affected by the order." 226 Although the
Energy Policy Act removed many of the native load protections that
existed under sections 211 and 2 12,227 these new provisions provide
assurance of native load protection.228
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 1301, H.R. 1543, and H.R. 2224: Bills on Elec-
tricity Regulation and Transmission Access, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 621-22 (1991) (statement of Rep.
Sharp) (stating that FERC must have power to assure that monopoly control of transmission
lines does not stifle competition); id at 636 (statement of Rep. Moorhead) (contending that
bill encourages optimal use of transmission access so that competition is increased in whole-
sale power market); id at 636-37 (statement ofRep. Markey) (noting that debate has not been
whether to provide greater access, but how to do so without economically harming utilities'
customers or sacrificing reliability). According to Subcommittee Chairman Sharp,
"[t]ransmission access is a critical tool for increasing bulk power competition. Our challenge
is to determine when [sic] the Congress must do and what powers FERC must have to assure
the monopoly control of transmission lines is not used to stifle competition .... That is why I
believe that opening up the transmission system is a natural complement to ... our overall
goal of encouraging a more competitive and efficient electric [industry]." Id at 621-22.
223. The Energy Policy Act deleted §§ 211(a)(1)-(3) and 212(a) of the FPA, which had
limited FERC power to mandate transmission service under the FPA. Energy Policy Act of
1992, §§ 721(2), 722(1), 106 Stat. at 2915-16 (amending §§ 211 and 212 of FPA). Section
21 l(a)(l)-(3) had required FERC to make findings that a proposed wheeling order would (1)
be in the public interest; (2) either conserve energy, promote efficiency, or improve reliability;
and (3) comply with § 212. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a)(1)-(3) (1988). Section 212(a) prevented issu-
ance of a wheeling order unless FERC found that it (1) would not be likely to result in a
reasonably ascertainable uncompensated economic loss to the transmitting utility; (2) would
not place an undue burden on the utility; (3) would not unreasonably impair reliability; and
(4) would not impair the ability of affected utilities to render adequate service to their custom-
ers. Id. § 824k(a). Notably, the new law also deleted § 21 l(c)(1), which had proved an effec-
tive bar to the exercise of FERC wheeling authority. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721(4), 106
Stat. at 2915; see also supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (concluding that § 21 l(c)(1) of
FPA prevented FERC from issuing wheeling orders).
224. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721(2), 106 Stat. at 2915 (barring wheeling order
that fails to comply with § 212 of FPA). The new law amends § 212, striking existing subsec-
tions (a) and (b) and inserting a new subsection (a) on transmission rates. Id. § 722(1), 106
Stat. at 2916. Under the new subsection (a), a wheeling order will "permit the recovery by
[the wheeling] utility of all the costs incurred in connection with the transmission services and
necessary associated services .... "d
225. Id § 721(2), 106 Stat. at 2915.
226. Id. § 721(3).
227. See supra notes 28-30, 33 and accompanying text (describing limits on FERC wheel-
ing authority under §§ 211 and 212 before enactment of Energy Policy Act).
228. See infra notes 231-49 and accompanying text (describing provisions of Energy Policy
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a. Recovery of the cost of providing transmission service
The Energy Policy Act attempts to ensure that a transmitting util-
ity will recover the cost of providing wheeling for third parties.2 29
Other legislative proposals would only have permitted the recovery
of the direct costs of providing transmission service, not both direct
and indirect costs associated with the service. 2 0 By contrast, the
Energy Policy Act permits the transmitting utility to recover forgone
benefits from displaced economy transactions by requiring FERC to
set rates that are designed to
permit the recovery by [the wheeling utility] of all the costs in-
curred in connection with the transmission services and necessary
associated services, including, but not limited to, an appropriate
share, if any, of the legitimate, verifiable and economic cost, in-
cluding taking into account any benefits to the transmission sys-
tem of providing the transmission services, and the costs of any
enlargement of transmission facilities. 23'
Full recovery of all forgone benefits is not assured, however, be-
cause FERC is required to assure that transmission rates "shall pro-
mote the economically efficient transmission and generation of
electricity .... "232 Because the promotion of transmission is best
achieved through low rates, the impact of the new law on Northeast
Utilities233 and Pennsylvania Electric Co.234 is unclear. In future pro-
ceedings before FERC, a wheeling utility could argue that the new
law permits recovery of both opportunity cost and the costs of any
enlargement of the utility's transmission facilities. First, FERC rec-
ognizes that opportunity costs are legitimate costs incurred by
wheeling utilities,235 and the new law permits recovery of "all costs
incurred in connection with the transmission services" by the wheel-
ing utility.236 Second, the new law explicitly identifies the cost of
Act intended to recover costs of providing transmission service and protect system reliability);
see also supra note 155 (reviewing public interest standard under FPA).
229. See infra text accompanying note 231 (discussing provision of Energy Policy Act that
permits transmitting utilities to recover all costs incurred in connection with transmission
services).
230. See, e.g., H.R. 2224, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1991) (allowing recovery only of pru-
dently incurred direct costs, as determined by FERC).
231. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 722(1), 106 Stat. at 2916 (establishing new § 212(a)).
232. Id.
233. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, at 61,203 (establishing transmis-
sion pricing goals that balance principle of holding native load customers harmless against
goal of setting "lowest reasonable cost-based rates"), reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.RC. 1
61,089 (1992).
234. 58 F.E.R.C. 61,278, at 61,873 (1992) (capping opportunity cost recovery at incre-
mental cost of system expansion).
235. See supra note 186-90 and accompanying text (explaining FERC's allowance of oppor-
tunity cost recovery by transmitting utilities).
236. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 722(1), 106 Stat. at 2916.
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any enlargement of transmission facilities as a cost that may be re-
covered by transmitting utilities. 23 7 It could be argued that the En-
ergy Policy Act permits recovery of both opportunity costs and
enlargement cost, while Pennsylvania Electric capped recovery of op-
portunity costs at the cost of enlargement. 238
Since the pricing provisions in the Energy Policy Act are hardly a
model of clarity, FERC interpretation of these provisions is likely to
be highly contentious. Despite the efforts by some to put flesh on
the bones of the legislative history of the electricity title of the En-
ergy Policy Act,239 FERC discretion to set transmission pricing ap-
pears to be undisturbed. The legislative history indicates that
237. Id.
238. See Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,278, at 61,873 (1992) (capping opportu-
nity cost recovery at incremental cost of system expansion).
239. Significantly, the conference report was silent on interpretation of the transmission
pricing provisions in § 722(1) of the Energy Policy Act. Other legislative history is at best
inconsistent; at worst contradictory. During House floor debate on the conference report on
H.R. 776, Representative Moorhead offered his view of the "legitimate, verifiable and eco-
nomic costs" that may be recovered by a wheeling utility under the transmission pricing
provisions:
In order for any cost to be recoverable, it must be legitimate; in other words, the
expense has to have been necessary. The cost must be verifiable; in other words, the
cost cannot be speculative, such as an unknown future economy sale that is foregone.
And the cost must be economic; in other words, it must be economically efficient for
all parties. Thus, the limitations in the pricing provision are guidance to the Com-
mission to reject the recovery of costs that are designed to frustrate transmission
access and competition.
I would also point out that the pricing language references by my colleague from
Indiana requires FERC to determine that an appropriate share, if any, of these costs
should be collected from the party requesting transmission services. For instance, in
a recent proceeding, the Commission established that a party can collect opportunity
costs or embedded costs, but not both. This appropriate share language is consis-
tent with that decision. Similarly, the provision requires a cost allocation of up-
grades to determine what share of upgrade costs are assignable to the applicant and
what costs should be assigned to the utility's native-load customers to reflect any
systemwide benefits. Finally, the pricing provision specifically directs FERC to mea-
sure these costs against the benefits received by the party providing transmission
services. In other words, FERC must ascertain the net costs incurred in providing
service when setting or approving rates and charges.
138 CONG. REC. H 1,413 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
Senate conferees offered an alternative interpretation of the meaning of "legitimate, verifia-
ble and economics costs" in § 722(1) of the Energy Policy Act, promising a higher level of
protection for native load customers. Senator Johnston described the meaning of these
provisions:
The conference report requires that the costs that may be recovered include, but not
be limited to, all costs involved in providing the transmission service, including those
of any enlargement of transmission facilities, as well as any other economic costs of
performing a wheeling transaction.
This could include the pro rata share of the cost of existing facilities used to pro-
vide the transmission service. Such costs must be verifiable, but it is not necessary
that the costs be incurred at this [sic] time the transmission rate is set. FERC may
allow the recovery of projections of future costs, including opportunity costs, based
upon the historical experience of the transmitting utility.... [E]xcept to the extent
to which they receive benefits, native customers should not be required to pay for
facilities that would not have been constructed but for a mandatory wheeling order.
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Congress did not intend to overturn the pricing formula established
by FERC in Northeast Utilities and Pennsylvania Electric Co. 240 Yet, the
138 CONG. REc. S17,613 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen.Johnston). Senator Wal-
lop commented further on the effect that wheeling orders will have:
A[] [wheeling] order shall allow the recovery of reasonably projected future costs,
particularly opportunity costs, based either upon the historical experience or existing
and planned arrangements of the transmitting utility, so long as an evidentiary basis
exists. Actual benefits to the transmission system of providing the service may be
taken into account, such as documented operational cost savings. Speculative bene-
fits to the transmission system, such as the mere existence of facilities that would not
have been constructed but for a mandatory wheeling order, are not to be credited
against the costs incurred in connection with the transmission services.... In order
to promote the economically efficient use of transmission and generation systems,
rates, charges, terms and conditions and transmission services must include all costs
associated with performing a transaction, including the costs of foregone alternative
uses for the facilities. In cases where the relevant market for delivered bulk power is
competitive, the market price will best reflect the true value of the use of facilities
and promote the economically efficient allocation of resources.
Id. at S17,618 (statement of Sen. Wallop). Senator Wallop argued that § 722(1) would en-
courage negotiated rates:
The purpose of this language is to encourage negotiated rates, where appropriate.
In cases where the relevant market-the market for delivered power-is competitive,
the negotiated or market price will reflect the true value of the use of facilities and
promote the economically efficient allocation of resources. In such cases, a market-
based rate shall be deemed to meet all the requirements of section 212(a).
Id at S17,647 (statement of Sen. Wallop).
The legislative history of the meaning in § 722(1) of "benefits to the transmission system"
that offset recovery of costs is also very narrow. The interpretation of this language was ad-
dressed in a colloquy between Senators Wallop and Lott during floor debate on the confer-
ence report.
LOTT: [Tihe conference agreement says the rates, charges, terms and conditions of
wholesale transmission services pursuant to a section 211 order shall permit the re-
covery of costs "including taking into account any benefits to the transmission sys-
tem of providing the transmission service." What are such "benefits to the
transmission system?"
WALLOP: The purpose of this language is to recognize that the electrical system of
a transmitting utility is a dynamic system which must handle numerous transfers of
electricity simultaneously. This phrase requires that where an order under section
211 causes benefits from reduced line losses on parts of the transmission system, the
reduced losses must be taken into account in the recovery of other costs, including
the costs of any increased losses in other portions of the transmission system.
138 CONG. REC. S17,647 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (colloquy between Sens. Lott and Wallop);
see also 2A NORMANJ. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.8 (5th ed. 1992)
(stating that colloquy between two House or Senate members may be useful in interpreting
conference reports).
240. Representatives Sharp and Moorhead engaged in a colloquy on the House floor dur-
ing debate on the conference report on H.R. 776. Following is an excerpt from that floor
discussion:
SHARP: Is it also the gentlemen's view that the bill does not affect-and specifically
does not contradict or overturn-any prior FERC decision, policy, or determination
with respect to the pricing of transmission services?
MOORHEAD: Indeed it is. I would have been very concerned had Congress un-
wisely gone down the road of attempting to micromanage the normal development
of agency policy. That language was replaced not because of a rejection of the bal-
ancing principle, but because of a recognition that transmission pricing is a very
complex matter. Rather than establish a pricing prescription with roots in a single
FERC decision, we chose to establish parameters and defer to the Commission's dis-
cretion to work within these parameters.
SHARP: I couldn't agree more with the gentlemen. I have to admit that personally
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legislative history also suggests that Congress did not codify FERC's
approach on transmission pricing.241 The conclusion must be
drawn that Congress determined to defer to the discretion of FERC
I am very much in favor of recent FERC transmission pricing policy, particularly the
delicate balance it achieved in the Northeast Utilities decision. As the gentlemen
know[ ], the House bill endorsed the analytical framework FERC laid out in that case,
balancing the need to compensate native load, the goal of promoting the lowest rea-
sonable transmission rates, and preventing the collection of monopoly rents.
MOORHEAD: I couldn't agree more with the gentlemen on the merits of FERC's
approach in the Northeast Utilities case. I am especially sensitive to the challenge
FERC faces in protecting consumers when it is asked to decide whether to allow
compensation for so-called opportunity costs. I would have liked to have seen the
House provision on this balancing test included in the bill approved by the confer-
ees. However, I am willing to support this bill without it because I am comfortable
that dropping the balancing test in no way affects, compromises, or overrules any
FERC decision.
138 CONG. REc. H1 1,413 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (colloquy between Reps. Sharp and Moor-
head); see also 2A SINGER, supra note 239, § 48.8 (stating that colloquy between two House or
Senate members may be useful in interpreting conference reports). Representative Moor-
head then commented further on the bill's language:
[A] negative inference should not be drawn from the fact that the final version of the
bill omits the language from H.R. 776 proposing FPA section 212(B)(2)-the so-
called Northeast Utilities language. The conferees do not intend for revised section
212 of the FPA to affect in any way existing Commission precedent applying the just
and reasonable ratemaking standard to transmission pricing determinations.
138 CONG. REc. HI 1,438 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). Although
the statement by Rep. Moorhead merits some weight in determining congressional intent with
respect to transmission pricing, it is certainly not dispositive. See 2A SiNGER, supra note 239,
§ 48.13 (noting that statements by individual legislators should only be given effect if consis-
tent with statutory language).
An earlier version of H.R. 776 approved by the House had included provisions intended
largely to codify the pricing principles in Northeast Utilities. See H.R. 776, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 723(b)(1) (1992). Under the House language, transmission rates "shall be designed to-(A)
compensate native load customers for legitimate and verifiable economic costs of providing
the transmission service, (B) provide the lowest reasonable transmission rates for the trans-
mission service, and (C) prevent the collection of monopoly rents by the transmitting utility
and promote the efficient transmission and generation of electricity." Id. The House pricing
formula for transmission services was very similar to the pricing principles established by
FERC in Northeast Utilities. Compare H.R. 776, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 723(b)(1) (1992) (man-
dating criteria for pricing transmission service) with Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C.
61,070, at 61,203 (establishing pricing principles for setting wheeling rates), reh'g dismissed as
moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992). Significantly, these provisions were dropped from the final
version of H.R. 776 that was enacted into law. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
486, § 722(1), 106 Stat. 2776, 2916 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824k).
241. During Senate floor debate on the conference report on H.R. 776, Senators John-
ston and Wallop engaged in a colloquy on the meaning of the transmission pricing provisions
of the new law that clarifies that Congress did not intend to codify the Northeast Utilities pricing
principles.
WALLOP: It is my understanding that the conferees reject codifying existing or past
FERC decisions regarding the pricing of electric transmission services. Is that the
Senator's understanding?
JOHNSTON: Yes; that is the case. The language in the conference report does not
endorse or reject present or past FERC decisions. It sets forth a new set of pricing
principles-within the just and reasonable standard of the Federal Power Act-to
guide the FERC in future pricing decisions.
WALLOP: In several recent decisions, including the Northeast Utilities case and the
Penelec decision, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission applied a very narrow
approach to the costs which a transmitting utility can recover from a transmission
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to continue to set transmission pricing policy. 242 Transmission
rates set by FERC must continue to be consistent with the "just and
customer. I believe this approach causes native load customers to subsidize trans-
mission services provided to others.
Does the chairman agree that this act does not endorse the Northeast Utilities
decisions or other recent Commission decisions regarding pricing policies for trans-
mission services?
JOHNSTON: I agree. The conference report neither endorses nor rejects these
decisions.
138 CONG. REc. S17,612-13 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (colloquy between Sens. Wallop and
Johnston); see also 2A SINGER, supra note 239, § 48.8 (stating that colloquy between two House
or Senate members may be useful in interpreting conference reports). The interpretation of
the transmission pricing provisions put forward by the Senate conferees appears to be on
sounder ground. Under the rules of statutory construction, the fact that the earlier codifica-
tion of the Northeast Utilities pricing principles was deleted from the final version enacted into
law creates a presumption that Congress did not intend to embrace these principles. See 2A
SINGER, supra note 239, § 48.04 ("[W]here the language under question was rejected by the
legislature and thus not contained in the statute it provides an indication that the legislature
did not want the issue considered."). This was clearly the understanding of the Senate con-
ferees, as reflected by the colloquy between Senators Wallop and Johnston.
WALLOP: [W]ould you also not agree that the pricing provisions in the original
House-passed bill, and the associated legislative history, cannot be invoked to inter-
pret pricing provisions of the conference report?
JOHNSTON: I agree. Subsection 212(a) is a complete substitute for the House-
passed transmission pricing provisions and, as a matter of law, has the full force and
effect of its plain meaning.
138 CONG. REC. S 17,613 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (colloquy between Sens. Wallop and John-
ston).
The Senate conferees also interpreted the transmission pricing provisions of the Energy
Policy Act as protecting native load customers by assuring wheeling utilities recover the full
cost of providing transmission service. This issue was also raised during the colloquy between
Senators Wallop and Johnston.
WALLOP: Does the distinguished floor manager agree that the provisions of subsec-
tion 212(a) do not require, nor allow any subsidization of transmission services by
the native load customers of the transmitting utility?
JOHNSTON: I agree that subsection 212(a) will not allow nor require, to the extent
practicable, any subsidy by the native load customers. The intent is to ensure that
transmitting utilities and their customers do not subsidize the provision of transmis-
sion services for others and that transmitting utilities are fully compensated for use
of their transmission system. That is precisely why the conference report adopts a
complete substitute for the House-passed pricing provision to assure that there will
be no subsidy of transmission services.
Id (colloquy between Sens. Wallop and Johnston).
242. The intention of Congress to defer to FERC on transmission pricing was evident.
This point was made clearly by Representative Sharp, Chairman of the House Energy and
Power Subcommittee and one of the principal architects of the Energy Policy Act, during floor
debate on the conference report:
I want to thank the conferees or [sic] their restraint in resisting efforts to have Con-
gress constrain the discretion of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [FERC]
in the area of electricity policy. I am particularly pleased that the provision concern-
ing the pricing of transmission services maintains the traditional broad statutory ap-
proach of the original Federal Power Act [FPA]. The FERC must retain sufficient
discretion to apply the traditional, time-tested FPA standards ....
138 CONG. REc. HI 1,400 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Sharp). Representative
Bliley, one of the original sponsors of transmission access legislation, described how the con-
ferees determined to defer to the discretion of FERC on pricing:
The transmission pricing provision contained in H.R. 776 are (sic] intended to
ensure that transmission services are available under just and reasonable rates.
Some parties have wanted us to specify detailed pricing standards that would dictate
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reasonable" standard governing ratemaking for wholesale power
sales and transmission rates, a point noted during floor discus-
sion.243 Although rates must fall within the "zone of reasonable-
ness" under the Energy Policy Act, FERC retains broad discretion
to set rates within this zone.244 There is a suggestion in the legisla-
tive history, however, that the pricing provisions of the Energy Pol-
icy Act were intended to limit FERC discretion to set wheeling
rates. 245
results in every circumstance. But all circumstances are not alike, and it would be
inappropriate for Congress to straitjacket the FERC.
Others had wanted us to endorse or condemn various pricing methodologies: op-
portunity cost pricing, marginal cost pricing, embedded cost pricing. We did not
take this approach. Indeed, the pricing language in the legislation establishes a sin-
gle guiding principle: A reaffirmation of the just-and-reasonable pricing standard
that has governed electric rate setting for years....
Mr. Speaker, in my view, the FERC has an affirmative responsibility under this
legislation to ensure that transmission rates are set in a manner that will encourage,
not stifle, competition. We are not regulators and cannot legislate pricing formulas
that would be appropriate to all types of transactions. For that reason, the conferees
established more general pricing guidance ....
Id HI 1,380-81 (statement of Rep. Bliley). Representative Moorhead also commented on the
effect of the pricing language:
The pricing language in existing section 212(a) allows the Commission to continue
traditional embedded-cost pricing, but also gives the Commission flexibility to de-
part from traditional pricing and to allow recovery of opportunity costs or incremen-
tal costs-including enlargement of facilities-if the Commission determines it
would result in just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential rates.
New section 723 [sic] continues this practice. The section allows the Commission
sufficient pricing flexibility to promote economically efficient transmission and gen-
eration of electricity, at the same time that it ensures that pricing does not result in
the collection of monopoly rents. The conferees also intend to allow the Commis-
sion flexibility to determine the circumstances under which the costs of enlargement
of transmission facilities may be recovered.
Id at Hi 1, 438 (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
243. Senator Wallop discussed the "just and reasonable standard" in Senate debate:
The "just and reasonable" standard referenced in section 212(a) has been well ar-
ticulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in itsJersey Central Power &
Light decision. Here the Court noted that rates are bounded by a "zone of reasona-
bleness," which is defined at the lower end by a prohibition against confiscatory rates
as to the electric utility and at the upper end by a prohibition against exorbitant rates
to consumers.
138 CONG. REC. S17,618 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wallop).
244. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing FERC discretion to set rates
within "zone of reasonableness").
245. Senator Wallop commented on the parameters of FERC discretion in setting wheel-
ing rates in Senate debate:
Th[e] formulation of the relationship between the traditional "just and reasonable"
standard and the specific pricing directions or [sic] the FERC contained in section
212(a) is critical because, in the absence of the specific pricing directions, FERC
would have somewhat greater discretion in setting the rates within the zone of rea-
sonableness under otherwise applicable law. That discretion is intentionally constrained by
the specific pricing directions provided by Congress, with the resulting rate being in the zone of
reasonableness.
138 CONG. REC. S17,622 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wallop) (emphasis
added).
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b. Reection of the "Utah Hammer"
Significantly, the new law rejects the "Utah Hammer," or the ab-
solute obligation imposed by FERC on utilities to provide transmis-
sion service within five years of a request by an eligible utility. That
is, the Energy Policy Act requires FERC to terminate or modify a
wheeling order if "the ordered transmission services require en-
largement of transmission capacity and the transmitting utility sub-
ject to the order has failed, after making a good faith effort, to
obtain the necessary approvals or property rights under applicable
Federal, State, and local laws." 246 By requiring that a wheeling or-
der be voided if the transmitting utility is unable to obtain the ap-
provals to expand transmission capacity necessary in order to satisfy
a third party wheeling request, after making a good faith effort to do
so, the new law adopts a due diligence standard and thereby rejects
FERC's "Utah Hammer."
247
2. Maintenance of transmission system reliability
The new law attempts to assure that increased wheeling will not
impair system reliability by barring issuance of a wheeling order that
would "unreasonably impair the continued reliability of electric sys-
tems affected by the order." 248 It was the intent of Congress that
246. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 721(5)(D), 106 Stat. 2776, 2916
(to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j). The legislative history of the meaning of this language is
extremely slender. Representative Moorhead was one Representative who did comment on
its meaning:
This section has raised the question of what is good faith? specifically [sic), the con-
cern is that a reluctant utility might make a half-hearted attempt at compliance, and
then evade the requirement to enlarge capacity by pleading that they could not com-
ply with the Commission's order. Under common law, a good-faith obligation im-
poses a higher standard of performance. Courts have recognized that good faith
reflects an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through technicalities of law. What this means is that a utility has an
affirmative obligation to pursue conscientiously and aggressively the requisite ap-
provals that will allow it to comply with the order of the Commission. This would
include making all appropriate filings and seeking review or reconsideration of ad-
verse rulings on the same basis as if the efforts to enlarge transmission facilities
where the result of an independent and voluntary decision by the utility, rather than
a Commission-imposed requirement.
138 CONG. REC. H11,438 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). But see 138
CONG. REC. S 17,617 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wallop) ("The requirement
for a 'good faith effort' does not mean that a utility must completely exhaust every conceivable
administrative, legal or financial remedy before being excused from the order; but a utility
must make a reasonable attempt to obtain the necessary property rights and approvals.").
247. The legislative history on the Energy Policy Act suggests that the conferees realized
they were repealing the "Utah Hammer." See 138 CONG. REC. S 17,617 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992)
(statement of Sen. Wallop) (interpreting "good faith effort" exemption from wheeling order
and stating that "[u]nder the provisions of the Conference Report, the FERC cannot legally
reinstitute the so-called 'hammer clause' of the Utah Power & Light-PacifiCorp merger").
248. Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721(3), 106 Stat. at 2915.
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reliability be maintained under the new regulatory regime. 249 Given
the difficulty of distinguishing between economy and reliability
transactions, 250 the effectiveness of this protection may prove of
small worth.
V. PROMOTING COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY: RECOMMENDED
REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
A. Native Load Customers Are Not Held Harmless Under Federal
Transmission Access Policy
Although FERC has declared that its transmission access policy is
designed to hold native load customers harmless from increased
utility costs resulting from wheeling,25' closer scrutiny reveals that
the policy falls short of this mark. Although the agency permits util-
ities to recover some forgone benefits from displaced economy
transactions, full recovery is denied and native load customers are
thus not held harmless.252 The new law may provide greater assur-
ance of cost recovery, because it permits wheeling utilities to re-
cover "all the cost incurred in connection with the transmission
services." 253 Transmission rates that do not fully reflect costs in-
curred by a wheeling utility send price signals that encourage
overuse of capacity. 254 Although it is the intention of both FERC
and Congress to promote increased wheeling and bulk power
trades, and discounting wheeling costs serves this objective, overuse
of transmission capacity poses reliability concerns when a system is
249. Senator Wallop addressed concerns of reliability in Senate debate:
FERC must assure that reliability is measured in terms of continued conformance with
regional and national reliability standards. Reliability is of paramount importance,
and is 'unreasonably impaired' under the statute when these standards are not
met.... [I]f reliability concerns are raised the FERC as a practical matter should not
issue an order under section 210 or section 211 unless it affirmatively finds that such
an order would preserve the reliability of affected electric systems. Anything less
than full reliability would constitute an unreasonable impairment, and would be in-
consistent with the clear statutory mandate of the FPA as amended by this Act.
138 CONG. REC. S17,617-18 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wallop).
250. See supra note 212 (discussing difficulty in distinguishing reliability and economy
transactions).
251. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, at 61,203 (stating that holding
native load customers harmless is appropriate goal in deciding pricing of transmission serv-
ices), reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
252. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text (describing limits placed on recovery
of opportunity costs in Northeast Utilities and Pennsylvania Electric Co.).
253. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 722(1), 106 Stat. 2776, 2916 (to
be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824k); see also supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text (discussing
cost recovery by wheeling utilities under new law).
254. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 54, at 163 (noting that when prices do not accurately
reflect costs, decisions regarding costs of overusing system may be distorted).
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constrained. 255 Efficient use of existing capacity would be promoted
by full recovery of opportunity costs, because the economic value of
wheeling would be more accurately reflected in transmission rates.
In order to promote efficiency in wheeling, FERC should expressly
provide for full recovery of opportunity costs incurred by transmit-
ting utilities.
B. FERC Should Rely on Pricing Incentives to Encourage Expansion of
Transmission Capacity
1. FERC transmission access policy fails where capacity is constrained
FERC recognizes that lack of transmission capacity prevents full
development of competitive bulk power markets.25 6 Where a trans-
mission system is inadequate to satisfy the needs of both the trans-
mitting utility and third parties, efficiencies are lost and competition
is forestalled. FERC recognizes that transmission system expansion
in constrained areas is necessary to achieve its goal of creating com-
petitive bulk power markets,2 57 and as a result, the agency has re-
sorted to the "Utah Hammer" and denial of full recovery of forgone
benefits to encourage utilities to expand transmission capacity.
2. Pricing incentives encourage expansion in transmission capacity
Utilities' full recovery of forgone benefits encourages efficient al-
location of the existing transmission system to its most valued uses.
Because opportunity cost pricing is designed only to hold harmless
the native load customers of a transmitting utility, however, such a
pricing system does not provide incentives to expand existing trans-
mission systems to permit expanded wholesale bulk power trad-
ing.258 This concern, in fact, initially led FERC to oppose recovery
of opportunity costs. 259 Later, FERC resorted to capping recovery
255. See KELLY ET AL., supra note 54, at 163 (explaining that "[rielatively low wheeling
prices may stimulate more demand for wheeling than the transmission system can handle").
256. In Public Service Co. of New Mexico, FERC stated that:
We recognize that in some sections of the country the principal impediment is proba-
bly physical rather than regulatory. Existing transmission lines are unable to carry
more electricity because they are being operated at or near their maximum secure
loading levels a high percentage of the time. In these areas, further exchanges can-
not occur unless additional transmission lines are built.
Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. 61,469, at 62,036 (1983).
257. Id.
258. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,027 (noting that full recov-
ery of forgone benefits would provide no incentive to utility companies to upgrade transmis-
sion systems), reh'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. V 61,070, reh'g
dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
259. See supra notes 200, 203 and accompanying text (noting that FERC originally held
that recovery of forgone benefits would provide utilities no incentive to upgrade their trans-
mission systems).
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of forgone benefits at the incremental cost of system expansion to
provide utilities with economic incentives to expand their transmis-
sion systems.260 In cases where forgone benefits exceed the incre-
mental costs of expansion, FERC hoped that utilities would act in an
"economically rational manner" and expand their transmission ca-
pacity voluntarily.26'
In the past, FERC depended on pricing incentives to spur utilities
to do voluntarily that which the agency could not order them to
do.262 Because FERC's broad discretion on ratemaking extends to
transmission rates, 263 the agency can use pricing incentives to en-
courage utilities to expand transmission and remove system con-
straints. In fact, FERC has embraced flexible pricing for
260. See Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,278, at 61,874 (1992) (explaining that
when transmitting utility modifies its system use to provide service to third-party wheeling
requests, opportunity costs may be incurred through forgone revenues). FERC has limited
full recovery of opportunity costs for the purpose of encouraging system expansion. In Penn-
sylvania Electric Co., the agency explained that:
Specifically, the cap at estimated or actual expansion costs gives [the utility] an eco-
nomic incentive to build additional transmission capacity if opportunity costs exceed
expansion costs. If [the utility] does not build, it will be unable to recover all of its
opportunity costs, and, therefore, to satisfy its stated goal of keeping its native load
customers harmless.
Id.
261. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340, at 62,104-05 (1991) (proposing
cap on recovery of opportunity costs at incremental cost of system expansion as spur to utility
to act in "economically rational manner" by expanding its transmission capacity), modified, 58
F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992).
262. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 61,242, at 61,794-95 (1987) (relying on
pricing flexibility to encourage utilities to provide voluntary transmission access), modified, 47
F.E.R.C. 61,121 (1989), modified, 50 F.E.R.C. 1 61,339 (1990), modified sub nom. Western Sys.
Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,099, at 61,319-21 (refusing to extend flexible pricing for econ-
omy transactions and transmission service due to concerns about market power), granting stay,
55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,495, appealfiled, No. 91-1404 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 26, 1991), modified, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,249 (1992); Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25
F.E.R.C. 61,469, at 62,029 (1983) (permitting pricing flexibility for power sales as quid pro
quo for commitment to wheel, "something we have limited authority to require").
263. FERC has the same discretion to set transmission rates as it does wholesale power
rates, because ratemaking for each type of transaction is governed by identical provisions in
the FPA, §§ 205-206. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-824e (1988) (authorizing FERC to set and regu-
late rates and charges for transmission and sale of electric energy under its jurisdiction).
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wheeling, 264 including auctioning of transmission capacity, 265 and
three-way shared savings26 6 to promote efficiency through the en-
couragement of economy transactions.267 A pricing scheme based
on shared savings would not encourage overconstruction because
264. See Entergy Servs. Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234, at 61,768 (1992) (approving shared
savings rate for non-firm transmission service); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. ] 61,145,
at 61,503 (1990) (agreeing to approve market-based rates for coordination sales and transmis-
sion services upon acceptance of open access conditions); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 40
F.E.R.C. 61,170, at 61,538-39 (1987) (affirming flexible pricing proposal for transmission
capacity based on competitive sealed-bid auction where all potential buyers have access to
same markets); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,782, 61,796-98 (approving zone of
reasonableness in flexible pricing for transmission services with three-way split savings ceil-
ing); Southern Co. Servs., Inc., 37 F.E.R.C. 61,190, at 61,452 (1986) (holding that split-
savings rates are reasonable alternative and extending concept of equal sharing to three-party
transactions to allow all utility participants to benefit).
Pricing flexibility represents a departure from cost-of-service rates, which is justified where
"a legitimate policy objective would be served." Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C.
61,469, at 62,049 (1983) (approving experiment in pricing flexibility for bulk power trades).
FERC has approved departures from cost-of-service ratemaking where an industry is exper-
iencing "contrasting or changing characteristics ...... Entergy Servs. Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. at
61,753 (quoting Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1503 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984)).
265. See Baltimore Gas &Elec. Co., 40 F.E.R.C. at 61,539 (concluding that auctioning trans-
mission capacity would improve efficiency and result in lower electricity costs for consumers).
266. See Entergy Servs. Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. at 61,768 (accepting three-way split savings rate for
nonfirm transmission customers as reasonable); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. 9 61,242,
at 61,782, 61,796-98 (1987) (approving zone of reasonableness in pricing for transmission
services with ceiling set at 33% of shared savings), modified, 47 F.E.R.C. 1 61,121 (1989), modi-
fied, 50 F.E.R.C. 61,339 (1990), modified sub nom. Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C.
6 1 ,099, granting stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh'g granted in part, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,495, appeal
filed, No. 91-1404 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1991), modified, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,249 (1992); Southern Co.
Servs., Inc., 37 F.E.R.C. at 61,451-52 (accepting three-way split savings rates as just and rea-
sonable because it is logical extension of more typical two-way split savings rate method).
Split savings rates are set by dividing the difference between the seller's cost of production
and the cost the buyer saves by not producing the electricity on its own system. Public Serv. Co.
of N.M., 25 F.E.R.C. at 62,049 (defining split savings rates pricing method). Under three-way
wheeling rates, the savings are divided equally among the buyer, seller, and transmitting util-
ity. Southern Co. Servs., Inc., 37 F.E.R.C. at 61,451. FERC declared that, "[s]haring of savings
from economy transactions . . . is consistent with the Commission's policy of encouraging
such transactions by giving sellers an incentive to make economy energy available while pro-
viding for an equitable distribution of benefits." Id. at 61,453.
267. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F.E.R.C. at 61,503 (accepting market-based rates for
transmission services in order to promote efficiency through increased reliance on coordina-
tion services); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 40 F.E.R.C. at 61,539 (affirming that auction process
for transmission service serves statutory objective of "improv[ing] economic efficiency by en-
couraging the lowest cost production of power... [which] should result in lower consumer
costs for electric energy"); Pacific Gas &Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C. at 61,796-98 (approving market
rates for transmission because they are more likely to result in efficient allocation of transmis-
sion capacity); Southern Co. Servs., Inc., 37 F.E.R.C. at 61,453 (accepting economical three-way
split savings rates for transmission service in name of efficiency).
FERC later rejected flexible pricing for wheeling in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 38 F.E.R.C.
61,242 (1987), out of concern about the utility's potentially anticompetitive exercise of market
power. See Western Sys. Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,099, at 61,319 (refusing to extend
flexible pricing for coordination and transmission services because applicant had "failed to
demonstrate the lack or mitigation of the transmission market power that admittedly exists in
certain segments of the WSPP region"), granting stay, 55 F.E.R.C. 61,154, reh 'ggranted in part,
55 F.E.R.C. 61,495, appealfiled, No. 91-1404 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 1991), modified, 59 F.E.R.C.
T 61,249 (1992).
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revenue is tied to use of the system. A wheeling utility may choose
to set aside a fixed share of its total transmission capacity to provide
service for third parties, or establish a transmission subsidiary that
would wheel on behalf of third parties and expand its system as
needed to satisfy their demands.
C. Necessary Changes to Federal Transmission Access Policy
The transmission access policy developed by FERC achieved indi-
rectly what the agency was prohibited from ordering directly.
Before enactment of the Energy Policy Act, the grant of wheeling
power in section 211 of the FPA was very limited, but FERC circum-
vented those limits by ordering wheeling through its merger and
ratemaking authority. 268 Congress had required through the FPA
that any wheeling order must be consistent with the restrictive terms
of sections 211 and 212,269 but FERC's oblique approach defied this.
congressional mandate. FERC manipulated the FPA to implement
its own policy goals to the extent that even Commission members
warned that the agency exceeded its authority and made decisions
properly reserved for Congress. 270 FERC was able to pursue its
electric transmission policy aggressively in large measure because it
268. See supra notes 46-50, 96 and accompanying text (explaining FERC's use of its
merger and ratemaking authority to expand transmission access).
269. See 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a)(l)-(4) (1988) (limiting FERC's power to order wheeling when
utility may suffer uncompensated economic loss or undue burden, reliability will be impaired,
and utility's ability to render adequate service to its customers will be impaired). This section
was deleted from the FPA by the Energy Policy Act. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-486, § 722(1), 106 Stat. 2776, 2916 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824k) (amending § 212
of FPA).
270. See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co., 56 F.E.R.C. 61,269, at 62,056 (Trabandt, Comm'r,
dissenting), reh'g granted, 57 F.E.R.C. 61,340 (1991), modified, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,070, reh'g
dismissed as moot, 59 F.E.R.C. 61,089 (1992). Commissioner Trabandt charged that the
agency was straying into an area properly reserved to Congress:
This case comes down to transmission: how to allocate the existing system, how to
expand it (including who pays for additions) and, in general, who runs the grid. The
current and soon-to-resume debates in Congress about reforming the structure of
the electric utility industry must come to grips with these same issues. This order
throws FERC's hat in the ring for the job of arbiter of the Nation's transmission grid.
Based on this order, I would throw the hat right back out.
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suffered little interference from the President, 27 1 Congress, 272 or
the courts. 273 Congress, however, has now reentered the field of
271. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 589 (1984) (describing existence of lesser presidential
control over independent agencies such as FERC than over executive agencies). Presidential
control over FERC is limited, due to its status as an independent regulatory commission. Id.
The powers and duties of the FPC were transferred to FERC by the Energy Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 95-91, § 402, 91 Stat. 565, 583 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1988)). Although FERC
was established nominally "within" the Department of Energy, it was created as an "in-
dependent regulatory commission." 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (1988). Significantly, beyond the
preparation of annual budget requests, § 7171 (j), the Department of Energy appears to lack
any means of control over FERC. This limited form of control has been weakened by the
congressional directive to FERC to recover its entire budget through user fees. See Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 3401, 100 Stat. 1874, 1890 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 7178(a) (1988)) (directing FERC to "assess and collect fees and annual charges
in any fiscal year in amounts equal to all of the costs incurred by the Commission in that fiscal
year"). As a testament to this limited degree of control, President Bush proposed legislation
early in 1991 to restructure FERC as a regulatory agency wholly within the executive branch.
S. 570, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 221 (1991); H.R. 1301, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 221 (1991).
272. Before the Energy Policy Act, Congress had not enacted any significant electric regu-
latory legislation in the past 10 years and has essentially left the field to FERC. Congress did
repeal a number of sections of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (Fuel Use
Act), Pub. L. No. 95-620, §§ 101-902, 92 Stat. 3289, 3289-3349 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 8301-8484 (1988)) in 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-42, § 1, 101 Stat. 310, 310-14 (1987).
The Fuel Use Act proscribed the use of natural gas to generate electricity in new electric
powerplants. Fuel Use Act, § 201, 92 Stat. at 3298 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 8311(a) (1988)). Repeal of the Fuel Use Act was hardly a significant action, because the
Department of Energy had never denied a petition for exemption from these restrictions.
H.R. REP. No. 78, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 270, 274.
The only other electricity statute of note enacted during the 1980s was the National Appliance
Energy Conservation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-12, §§ 2-11, 101 Stat. 103, 103-26 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291-6309 (1988)). This relatively unimportant legislation is
limited to establishing national energy conservation standards for 12 major residential appli-
ances. S. REP. No. 6, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 52, 52-
53.-
273. The main constraint on judicial review of FERC orders and rulemakings in the field
of electric regulation is the breadth of authority granted to FERC by the FPA, See 16 U.S.C.
§§ 824a-824k (1988) (granting FERC authority to regulate all electric utility companies en-
gaged in interstate commerce). Like many of the New Deal statutes, the FPA affords FERC
wide discretion and authorizes the agency to act based on a finding that such action serves the
"public interest" or is 'just and reasonable." See Vermont Dep't of Pub. Serv. v. FERC, 817
F.2d 127, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding FERC interpretation of electric wholesale sales
contract because FPA granted agency broad discretion to oversee "just and reasonable" elec-
tric rates); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1570-71 (D.C. Cir.) (not-
ing that terms "just and reasonable" in statute signify great degree of discretion accorded
FERC by Congress), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987);Jerome Nelson, The Chevron Deference Rule
and Judicial Review of FERC Orders, 9 ENERGY LJ. 59, 70 (1991) (noting that courts are more
likely to defer to agencies in construction of statutes with ambiguous terms such as "just and
reasonable" and "public interest"). As a result, courts have shown great deference to FERC
orders and rulemakings issued under the FPA. See Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 885 F.2d 962,
964 (1st Cir. 1989) (affirming FERC orders setting wholesale electric rates because agency has
discretion under FPA regarding ratemaking); Clark-CowlitzJoint Operating Agency v. FERC,
826 F.2d 1074, 1087-89 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming FERC order construing municipal relic-
ensing provision of FPA because interpretation of statute was reasonable), cert, denied, 485
U.S. 913 (1988); Greensboro Lumber Co. v. FERC, 825 F.2d 518, 522-23 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(affirming cogeneration rule because Congress clearly assigned administration of PURPA to
FERC and construction by agency was reasonable); Vermont Dep't of Pub. Sert., 817 F.2d at 135
(upholding FERC interpretation of electric transmission contract because FPA granted
agency "broad discretion to oversee energy rate regulation"); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v.
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electric regulatory policy, approving legislation that mitigates native
load impact by providing for recovery of forgone benefits, 274 re-
quires that any wheeling order maintain reliability,275 abandons the
"Utah Hammer" in favor of a due diligence test,2 76 and adopts a
public interest standard that is intended to assure that wheeling or-
ders will not have an undue impact on native load customers.
277
The transmission access policy established by FERC and mirrored
to some degree by Congress' actions278 must be changed to bring it
in line with the FPA. First, full recovery of forgone benefits must be
allowed in order to hold native load customers harmless, and the
proposed cap on recovery of opportunity costs based on the incre-
mental cost of system expansion must be abandoned. 279 Second,
the "Utah Hammer" should be replaced by a due diligence standard
for use in FERC's review of nonsatisfaction of third-party wheeling
requests. 280 Third, some form of incentive pricing should be estab-
lished to encourage utilities to expand their transmission systems,
FERC, 805 F.2d 1068, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (denying challenge to FERC interpretation of
fuel adjustment clause because FPA "endows the Commission with broad latitude"); Aliceville
Hydro Assocs. v. FERC, 800 F.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (affirming FERC interpretation
because deference is owed agency in interpretation of hydropower licensing regulations);
Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 767 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985) (sustaining FERC decision
because agency's construction of FPA hydroelectric licensing standard was "reasonable and
not contrary to the Act"); Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (denying petition for review of wholesale electric rate order because no abuse of FERC
discretion was shown), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984). But see Gulf States Utils. Co. v.
FERC, 872 F.2d 487, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (remanding FERC order requiring utility to pro-
vide backup power to cogeneration facility for want of coherent explanation of FERC's deter-
mination that order was required by PURPA); American Mun. Power-Ohio, Inc. v. FERC, 863
F.2d 70, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (suspending order setting wholesale electric rate because FERC
had not supplied reasoned basis for order); Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. FERC, 832 F.2d 1201,
1225 (10th Cir. 1987) (remanding electric rate orders because FERC erred in ordering rates
effective on date FERC issued opinions rather than on date agency accepted utility's compli-
ance filings); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (vacating rate order because no evidence refuted petitioner's assertion that scheduled
rate was confiscatory); Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 747 F.2d 763, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(overturning order suspending electric rates because FERC lacked authority under FPA to
suspend rates), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 930 (1985).
274. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 722(1), 106 Stat. 2776, 2916 (to
be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824k) (permitting utility to recover "all the costs incurred in con-
nection with the transmission services").
275. See id § 721(3) (barring FERC order for electric energy wheeling if such order would
unreasonably impair reliability of utility system).
276. See id § 721(5)(D) (vacating wheeling order where transmitting utility fails to obtain
necessary approvals or property rights after making good faith effort).
277. See id § 721(2) (including public interest requirement for FERC to weigh in issuance
of electric transmission orders).
278. See supra notes 218-34 and accompanying text (explaining new law designed to ex-
pand FERC's wheeling authority and promote competition in wholesale power markets).
279. See supra notes 184-99, 251-55 and accompanying text (asserting that partial recovery
of forgone benefits permitted by FERC does not hold native load customers harmless).
280. See supra notes 86-91, 246-47 and accompanying text (reviewing objections to "Utah
Hammer" and comparing it to "good faith" standard in H.R. 776).
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because opportunity cost pricing only provides for the most efficient
allocation of existing capacity.28 1 Fourth, the separate market
power tests for generation and transmission should be abandoned
in favor of a unitary test measuring whether adequate alternative
sources of electric supply exist. 2
8 2
CONCLUSION
In its ardor to promote competition in bulk power markets, FERC
has reinterpreted the FPA and established the enhancement of
transmission system access as an overriding statutory responsibility,
even though no such duty is assigned to the agency by the express
terms of the FPA. Frustrated in its efforts to order wheeling directly
through the limited grant of authority in PURPA, FERC indirectly
pursued transmission access through its merger and ratemaking au-
thority. In the process, FERC ignored other statutory responsibili-
ties that it is obliged to meet, namely its duties to encourage
conservation and efficiency, prevent harm to native load customers,
promote system coordination services, and assure reliability of ser-
vice. Given the importance of the transmission system to reliable
electric service in the United States, these deficiencies should be
corrected in an expeditious manner through rulemakings on trans-
mission access policy. There will be an opportunity to revisit trans-
mission access policy during implementation of the Energy Policy
Act because FERC has indicated that between three and five
rulemakings are needed to implement the new law.2 8 3 Finally, it is
entirely possible that FERC may take a different path under the
Clinton administration and place less trust in the potential
macroeconomic benefits from discounting the cost of transmission
services. To the extent that a greater primacy is placed on protect-
ing native load customers, FERC in a Clinton administration may
raise transmission pricing to guarantee full cost recovery by the
wheeling utility.
281. See supra notes 256-67 and accompanying text (stating that pricing incentives en-
courage expansion of transmission capacity and remove system constraints).
282. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text (stating that FERC adopted new three-
part test for measuring market power over generation and transmission without explaining its
departure from earlier approach that focused on viable alternative sources of energy).
283. See Energy Bill Passage Likely To Prompt Big Package of Rulemakings at FERC, ELEC. UTIL.
WK., Oct. 12, 1992, at 13 (quoting FERC General Counsel William Scherman as stating that
Energy Policy Act will result in "at least two or three rulemakings just on the electric side").
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